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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis first focuses on reviewing the literature in the field of persecutory and 
grandiose delusions and the role of self-esteem in their development and maintenance. 
An empirical study exploring first person accounts of grandiose beliefs is then 
considered. 
 
A systematic review of the literature was conducted to elucidate the role of self-esteem 
in persecutory and grandiose delusions. Electronic databases were searched and thirty 
four studies were included. The review yielded largely mixed results. A number of 
higher quality studies indicated that persecutory delusions are associated with low self-
esteem and that they are predicted by fluctuations in self-esteem. There was some 
evidence showing that grandiose delusions are associated with higher self-esteem. 
Studies investigating grandiose delusions are scarce, suggesting a need for further high 
quality research in this area. 
 
An empirical study was conducted to explore the lived experience of individuals with 
grandiose beliefs, with the purpose of developing a theory of grandiose beliefs. Seven 
individuals were interviewed using a Semi-Structured Interview Schedule. A Grounded 
Theory method was used. The findings demonstrated a number of shared processes: 
Expanding Sense of Self, Higher Consciousness, Search for Healing, Re-gaining 
Control and Element of Truth and Validation. The developed theory suggested that 
multiple pathways could lead to the onset of grandiose beliefs, including a pathway 
leading from the experience of paranoid to grandiose beliefs. The implications of the 
developed framework of grandiose beliefs for future research and clinical practice are 
considered. 
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SECTION 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Role of Self-esteem in the Development and Maintenance of Delusions:  
A Systematic Literature Review Focusing on Persecutory and Grandiose 
Delusions 
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Abstract 
Objectives. Persecutory and grandiose delusions are very common in psychiatric 
conditions such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. The existing theoretical 
accounts of these delusions view emotion and self-esteem as central in their 
development and maintenance but differ on their exact role. The review aimed to 
synthesize the large body of published research, focusing on the role of self-esteem. 
Methods. Web of Knowledge, PsychInfo, and MEDLINE databases were searched 
for relevant studies. Following screening for relevance and a rigorous quality 
assessment, 34 studies were included. Only five of these investigated grandiose 
delusions. 
Results. The findings revealed difficulties for the field with defining and measuring 
self-esteem. Higher quality studies provided some evidence for the emotion-
consistent account of persecutory delusions, which argues for the direct rather than 
defensive role of self-esteem in the development and maintenance of delusions. 
Persecutory delusions appeared to be associated with low self-esteem. Furthermore, 
they were predicted by fluctuations and decreases in self-esteem. Although grandiose 
delusions appeared to be associated with higher self-esteem, there is some evidence 
that this may be mood dependent and that negative self-esteem may predict the onset 
of grandiose delusions too. 
Conclusions. There is a need for better quality studies to explore the development 
and maintenance of grandiose delusions. Future research should investigate 
confounding factors such as comorbidity of persecutory and grandiose delusions, 
mood and deservingness, which may have impacted on the research to date resulting 
in the discrepant findings observed.  
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The role of self-esteem in the development and maintenance of delusions: A 
systematic literature review focusing on persecutory and grandiose delusions 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 
defines delusions as false beliefs based on incorrect assumptions and maintained 
despite evidence to the contrary (APA, 2000).  In line with this, persecutory or 
paranoid delusions have been defined as false beliefs characterised by themes of 
persecution and the persecutors’ intention to cause harm (APA, 2000). Similarly, 
grandiose delusions (GDs) have been defined as false beliefs featuring an inflated 
sense of worth (APA, 2000).  For example, an individual experiencing this type of 
delusion may believe that they have special powers, wealth or knowledge, or that 
they are related to a famous person. These traditional definitions are based on the 
ideas of Kraepelin (1899) and Jaspers (1913) that delusions are pathological and 
irrational processes resistant to change, and they continue to dominate modern 
psychiatry. However, delusions are increasingly being conceptualised as situated on 
a continuum with ordinary beliefs, ranging from transient beliefs to full-blown 
delusions, and differing in conviction, preoccupation and distress (Bentall, Jackson, 
& Pilgrim, 1988; Oltmanns, 1988; Strauss, 1969). This is reflected in the growth of 
research studying beliefs such as paranoia and grandiosity in general populations. 
The prevalence of paranoia in the general population has been reported to range 
between 1.8% to 18.6% (Freeman et al., 2011), whilst the prevalence of grandiosity 
was found to be 48% (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999). 
Clinically relevant persecutory and grandiose delusions are common in 
psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and depression 
(Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 1999). In a sample of 328 inpatients experiencing 
delusions, Appelbaum et al. (1999) found that 78% reported persecutory delusions 
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and 43% reported GDs. Whilst early research focused on diagnostic categories, more 
recently researchers have acknowledged difficulties with this approach, noting that 
psychotic symptoms do not always cluster together as predicted by diagnosis (British 
Psychological Society, 2000).  Researchers have therefore begun to investigate 
specific psychotic symptoms and their underlying psychological processes, using 
trans-diagnostic samples (Bentall, 1990; Bentall, Rowse, Kinderman, et al., 2008; 
Bentall, Rowse, Shryane, et al., 2009; Persons, 1986).    
The existing theoretical accounts of delusions place the role of emotion and 
self-esteem at their centre and can be divided into two groups: emotion-consistent 
accounts (Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001; Smith, N., Freeman, & Kuipers, 2005) 
and defence theories (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Neale, 1988).  The 
proponents of the emotion-consistent accounts argue for a direct role of emotion in 
the development of delusional beliefs. For example, Freeman et al. (2001) argue that 
persecutory delusions reflect the true emotional state of an individual, such as 
feelings of anxiety, depression, vulnerability, and low self-esteem. Similarly, 
Freeman and Garety (2003) alongside Smith, N. et al. (2005) suggest that GDs may 
relate to current positive emotion and preserved areas of self-esteem. Feelings of 
elation and mood-congruent positive beliefs are proposed to further reinforce 
positive self-concept and subsequently lead to development of GDs (Smith, N. et al., 
2005).  
Defence theories on the other hand suggest that delusions serve a defensive 
function, protecting an individual from distressing emotions and low self-esteem. 
Defence theories of persecutory delusions originate from Freud’s (1917) 
psychoanalytic formulations of paranoia, which propose that ideas incompatible with 
the ego are projected into the external world (McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007). 
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Contemporary defence theories postulate that individuals with persecutory delusions 
develop delusions as a consequence of attributing negative events to the actions of 
other people, a strategy employed to protect them from low self-esteem entering 
their consciousness (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Bentall, Corcoran, 
Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001). Neale (1988) further developed 
Abraham’s (1911) defence theory of mania and GDs by incorporating ideas from the 
Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory, which postulates that a perceived 
discrepancy between ideal and actual self, results in psychological discomfort and 
increases motivation to reduce this discrepancy.  An actual-ideal self-discrepancy 
has been observed in individuals who are depressed (Scot & O’Hara, 1993; 
Strauman & Higgins, 1988; Strauman, 1989). According to Neale (1988), mania and 
GDs are possible strategies for reducing the discrepancy between these two self-
representations, and for avoiding distressing cognitions and low self-esteem.  
These two theoretical accounts inspired a large body of research, which has 
tried to shed light on their usefulness. However, to date, there has been no attempt to 
systematically review the published literature. This review aimed to investigate the 
evidence regarding the role of self-esteem in the development and maintenance of 
grandiose and persecutory delusions to inform both theoretical understanding and 
clinical practice. 
Method 
Search Method 
The Web of Knowledge, PsychInfo, and MEDLINE databases were last 
searched for relevant studies in May 2013
1
. The references of all the relevant studies 
and Google Scholar were also checked. The following terms were combined for 
vvvv                                                        
1 An additional article was published in July 2013. The inclusion of this article in the review would 
not significantly change the results, conclusions and implications drawn. 
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searching: (self-esteem OR self-worth OR self-evaluation) AND (persecutory OR 
paranoi* OR grandios* OR grandeur OR delusion*). The terms were searched in all 
fields of an article. The process of identification and inclusion of relevant studies in 
the review is shown in the flow diagram (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram (following Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman & 
The PRISMA Group, 2010).  
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The Web of Knowledge identified 386 abstracts. After excluding publications 
that were not written in English, 332 abstracts were screened for relevance and 
inclusion/exclusion criteria. Following this, 47 full text papers were checked for 
relevance and inclusion/exclusion criteria. No additional articles were identified 
through other sources. 
Inclusion/Exclusion criteria 
Studies were only included in the review if they were published or translated 
into English language and if they were peer reviewed. Conference, meeting and 
dissertation abstracts were excluded. Those studies that looked at attributional style 
or self-discrepancies but did not measure self-esteem directly were excluded. Those 
studies that considered psychosis, positive symptoms or delusions in general but did 
not specifically measure persecutory or GDs were excluded. Only studies 
investigating clinically relevant delusions were included, so studies employing 
student and general population samples investigating delusion-like beliefs were 
excluded. A total of 36 peer reviewed studies were assessed for their methodological 
quality. 
Quality Rating 
All the studies were rated for scientific quality and rigour using the adapted 
checklist created by Downs and Black (1998) (Appendix A). This quality rating tool 
was developed to assess the methodological quality of both randomised and non-
randomised studies. Since all of the studies in this review were cohort, case-control 
and cross-sectional studies, only questions applicable to these types of design were 
used to rate their quality. The tool assesses four areas of quality: (a) reporting, (b) 
external validity, (c) internal validity, and (d) power. Each of these areas were given 
equal weight, with studies that scored high in all four areas deemed to be of the  
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highest quality. Studies with a low score in only one of the four areas were deemed 
to be of moderate quality. Studies with a low score in two of the four areas were 
rated as low quality. Two studies scored low in all four areas and were excluded 
from the review (Appendix B). Twelve studies chosen at random were independently 
assessed and scored by a second rater. The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient was 
0.98 suggesting an excellent inter-rater reliability (Fleiss, 1981).  
Results 
The review included 34 studies and only five of those specifically 
investigated GDs. Summaries of high, moderate and low quality studies can be 
found in Tables 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Six themes emerged as significant: (a) 
explicit versus implicit self-esteem (including the discrepancy between the two, the 
difference between individuals with current versus remitted delusions and the 
difference between individuals with poor me versus bad me paranoia); (b) positive 
versus negative self-esteem; (c) fluctuations in self-esteem; (d) co-morbidity of 
grandiose and persecutory delusions; (e) social self-esteem; and (f) causal role of 
self-esteem. The first three themes reflected the conceptualisation and measurement 
of self-esteem. The difficulties conceptualising and measuring self-esteem will be 
considered first. The six themes will then be discussed in turn. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  
Summary of high quality studies 
Note. SEI= Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory, BCSS= Brief Core Schema Scales 
Study Sample Self-esteem measure Findings 
Drake et al. (2004) First-episode psychosis (n=257) SEI When paranoia and self-esteem were related greater 
paranoia was related to low self-esteem. 
 
Fowler et al. (2012) Non-affective psychosis (n=301) 
(schizophrenia, n=257; schizo-affective 
disorder, n=40; delusional disorder, n=4)  
(same sample as Garety, P. et al., 2012) 
BCSS Evidence of pathways leading from negative 
cognition (including self-evaluation) to paranoia 
rather than those in the opposite direction. Negative 
cognition independently predicted paranoia. 
 
Garety et al. (2012) Non-affective psychosis (n=301) 
(schizophrenia, n=257; schizo-affective 
disorder, n=40; delusional disorder, n=4)  
 
BCSS & SEI Persecutory delusions were predicted by negative 
self-evaluations, depression and anxiety. GDs were 
predicted by less negative self-evaluations and less 
depression and anxiety. 
 
Palmier-Claus et al. 
(2011) 
First-episode psychosis (n=256) (same sample 
as Drake et al., 2004) 
SEI Negative self-esteem level and fluctuations in 
positive self-esteem predicted paranoia. 
 
Romm et al. (2011) Schizophrenia spectrum disorder (n=113) 
(schizophrenia, n=68; schizophreniform 
disorder, n=7; schizoaffective disorder, n=11; 
brief psychosis, n=1; delusional disorder, n=7; 
psychosis NOS, n=19) 
 
SEI Lower self-esteem was associated with greater 
paranoid delusions, after depression was controlled 
for. 
Smith, B. et al. (2006) Non-affective psychosis (n=100) 
(schizophrenia, n=78; schizo-affective 
disorder, n=20; delusional disorder, n=2)  
(part of the same sample as Garety et al., 2012) 
BCSS & SEI Low self-esteem and negative self-evaluations were 
associated with greater paranoid delusions. Higher 
self-esteem and less negative self-evaluations were 
associated with greater GDs. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary of moderate quality studies 
Study Sample Self-esteem measure Findings 
Bentall, Rowse, 
Kinderman, et al. 
(2008) 
Currently paranoid group (schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder or delusional disorder, 
n=39) 
Remitted paranoid group (schizophrenia 
spectrum, n=29) 
Paranoid depressed group (major depression, 
n=20) 
Nonpsychotic depressed group (major 
depression, n=27) 
Healthy control group (n=33) 
 
SERS Negative but not positive self-esteem was associated 
with paranoia, independent of mood. 
Bentall, Rowse, 
Shryane, et al. (2009) 
Current paranoid group (schizophrenia and 
schizoaffective disorder, n=39) 
Late onset paranoid (late-onset schizophrenia-
like psychosis and delusional disorder,(n=29) 
Depressed & Paranoid group (major 
depression with psychotic features and major 
depressive disorder (n=20) 
Remitted paranoid group (schizophrenia and 
schizoaffective disorder, n=29) 
Older depressed group (major 
depression,(n=29) 
Younger depressed group (major depression, 
n=27) 
Younger healthy control (n=33) 
Older healthy control (n=31) 
 
SERS Paranoid delusions were associated with low self-
esteem, independent of depression and anxiety 
Ben-Zeev et al. (2012) Schizophrenia (n=144) 
Schizoaffective disorder (n=55) 
 
SERS-SF Negative self-esteem predicted occurrence of GDs. 
 
 
 
    
Erickson & Lysaker 
(2012) 
Schizophrenia (n=37) 
Schizoaffective disorder (n=20) 
SEI Decreasse in self-esteem predicted increases in 
paranoia 
 
    
Green et al. (2006) Individuals with persecutory delusions (n=70) 
(schizophrenia, n=63; schizo-affective 
disorder, n=7) 
SEI Higher self-esteem and lower depression were related 
to feeling more powerful during persecutory 
experiences 
 
Jones et al. (2010) Schizophrenia resistant to medication (n=87) SEI Negative association between persecutory ideas and 
self-esteem disappeared after depression was 
controlled for. Positive association between 
grandiose ideas and self-esteem found at baseline but 
not longitudinally. Changes in GDs did not predict 
changes in self-esteem. 
 
Kesting et al. (2011) Currently deluded group (n=28) 
(schizophrenia) 
Remitted deluded group (n=31) 
(schizophrenia) 
Healthy controls (n=59) 
Depressed controls (n=21) 
 
SEI & IAT Paranoid and depressed groups showed decreased 
explicit but normal implicit self-esteem when 
compared with healthy controls. There was no 
discrepancy. 
Lincoln, Mehl, Exner, 
et al. (2009) 
Acute or remitted primary persecutory 
delusions (n=50) (schizophrenia (n=45), 
delusional disorder (n=3), schizoaffective 
disorder (n=2)) 
High subclinical paranoia (n=25) 
Low subclinical paranoia (n=25) 
 
SEI Those with acute delusions had lowest self-esteem, 
followed by those with remitted delusions. 
Lincoln, Mehl, Ziegler, 
et al. (2010) 
Schizophrenia spectrum disorders (n=83) 
Nonclinical controls (n=33) 
FSKN (global self-
worth subscale) 
Low global self-esteem was associated with 
depression and negative interpersonal self-concept 
with paranoia. 
 
    
 
 
 
Note. SERS= Self-Esteem Rating Scale, SERS-SF= Self-Esteem Rating Scale-Short Form, IAT= Implicit Association Test, FSKN= Frankfurt Scales of Self-
Concept, ESM= Experience Sampling Method 
   
Moritz, Klinge, et al. 
(2010) 
Schizophrenia spectrum disorders (n=58) 
Nonclinical controls (n=44) 
SEI There was no association between self-esteem and 
paranoid delusions. There was a moderate association 
between higher self-esteem and GDs. 
 
 
Thewissen, Bentall, 
Lecomte, et al. (2008) 
 
Currently paranoid group (n=30) 
(schizophrenia/psychotic disorder, n=28; 
schizoaffective disorder, n=2) 
Currently nonparanoid group (n=34) 
(schizophrenia/psychotic disorder, n=28; 
schizoaffective disorder, n=6) 
Remitted group (n=15) 
(schizophrenia/psychotic disorder, n=14; 
schizoaffective disorder, n=1) 
High schizotypy controls (n=38) 
(mild/moderate depression, n=4) 
Healthy controls (n=37) (mild/moderate  
depression, n=6) 
 
 
SERS & ESM 
 
Decrease in state self-esteem predicted an increase in 
paranoia. Trait paranoia was related to lower and 
more unstable self-esteem. 
Thewissen, Bentall, 
Oorschot, et al. (2011) 
same sample as Thewissen et al.(2008) 
 
ESM Decrease in state self-esteem and an increase in 
anxiety separately predicted the occurrence of 
paranoia. Paranoid episodes were characterized by 
low levels of self-esteem. 
 
Vazquez et al. (2008) Acute delusional group (n=40)  
Remitted delusional group (n=25) 
Major depressive episode group (n=35) 
Healthy controls (n=36) 
 
SEI & SRIRT Individuals with delusions had lower explicit and 
implicit self-esteem. There was no discrepancy. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Summary of low quality studies 
Study Sample Self-esteem measure Findings 
Candido & Romney 
(1990) 
Paranoid group without depression (n=15) 
(paranoid disorder, N=4; paranoid 
schizophrenia, n=11) 
Paranoid group with depression (n=15) 
( paranoid disorder, N=2; paranoid 
schizophrenia, n=13) 
Depressed group (n=15) 
(major unipolar depression) 
 
SEI Paranoid group had highest self-esteem and 
depressed group had lowest self-esteem, associated 
with depression. Paranoid group without depression 
had significantly more grandiose ideas. 
Chadwick et al. (2005) Poor me group (n=36) (paranoid schizophrenia 
(n=32), schizo-affective disorder (n=3), 
psychotic depression (n=1)) 
Bad me group (n=14) (paranoid schizophrenia 
(n=12), 
psychotic depression (n=1) 
schizo-affective disorder (n=1)) 
 
SEI & EBS Bad me group had lower self-esteem, more negative 
self- evaluations, depression and anxiety. Differences 
in self-esteem were partly due to depression. 
Combs et al. (2009) Persecutory delusions group (n=32) 
Non-persecutory delusions (n=28) 
(schizophrenia) 
Healthy controls (n=50) 
 
SEI Those with persecutory delusions had lower self-
esteem and greater depression and anxiety. 
Fornells-Ambrojo & 
Garety (2009) 
Persecutory deluded group with poor me 
paranoia (n=20) (schizophrenia, 
schizophreniform or schizoaffective disorder) 
Healthy controls (n=32) 
Depressed controls  (n=21) 
SEI Poor me group had normal levels of self-esteem, 
more anger, anxiety and depression. 
 
 
 
 
Freeman, Garety, 
Fowler, et al. (1998) 
Drug resistant psychosis (n=53) 
(schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and 
delusional disorder; persecutory delusions 
(n=28), other symptoms (n=25) 
 
RSCQ Most individuals with persecutory delusions had low 
self-esteem. Changes in self-esteem were not 
associated with changes in delusional conviction.  
Freeman, Garety & 
Kuipers (2001) 
Persecutory delusions (n=25) (schizophrenia 
(n=18), schizo-affective disorder (n=5), 
delusional disorder (n=2) 
SEI Those who thought their persecution was deserved 
had lower self-esteem and higher anxiety and 
depression. 
 
    
Humphreys & 
Barrowclough (2006) 
Recent onset psychosis (n=35) 
(persecutory delusions group (n=15), no 
persecutory delusions group (n=20)) 
SEI & SESS-sv Persecutory delusions group had more negative self-
evaluations (SESS). Association between negative 
self-evaluations and paranoia remained after 
controlling for mood but association between 
paranoia and low self-esteem (SEI) did not. 
 
Kinderman (1994) Persecutory delusions group (n=16) 
(schizophrenia, n=13; delusional disorder, 
n=3) 
Depressed group (n=16) 
Nonclinical control group (n=16) 
 
EST Patient groups had slower reaction times and showed 
interference when naming a color of words with 
personal description. 
MacKinnon et al. 
(2011) 
Persecutory delusions (n=16) (schizophrenia 
(n=14), schizoaffective disorder (n=1), 
psychotic mood disorder (n=1) 
Healthy controls (n=20) 
SEI, BCSS & IAT Individuals with persecutory delusions had lower 
self-esteem and more negative self-evaluations, 
which was associated with depression and anxiety. 
 
McCulloch et al. (2006) Late onset psychosis with primary persecutory 
delusions (n=13) 
Depressed group (n=15) 
Healthy controls (n=15) 
 
SEI & EST Psychosis group and healthy controls had higher 
explicit self-esteem. There were no differences in 
implicit self-esteem. 
McKay et al. (2007) Currently paranoid group (n=10) 
Remitted paranoid group (n=10) 
(schizophrenia (n=15), bipolar disorder (n=3), 
SEI, Adjective Self 
Relevance Rating 
Task, IAT 
Currently paranoid group scored lower on explicit 
and implicit measures of self-esteem. Only the 
differences found using implicit measures were 
 
 
 
Note. EBS= Evaluative Beliefs Scale, RSCQ= Robson Self Concept Questionnaire, SESS-sv= Self-Evaluation and Social Support Interview, SRIRT= Self-
Referent Incidental Recall Task, E-SEI= Explicit Self-Esteem Index
schizoaffective disorder (n=2)) 
Healthy control group (n=19) 
 
significant once depression was controlled for.  
Mehl et al. (2010) Current persecutory delusions (n=23) 
(schizophrenia spectrum disorders) 
Remitted persecutory delusions (n=18) 
(schizophrenia spectrum disorders) 
Nonclinical controls (n=22) 
SEI & IAT Those with current delusions had low explicit and 
normal implicit self-esteem. 
    
Moritz, Werner, et al. 
(2006) 
Schizophrenia inpatients (n=23) (persecutory 
delusions (n=13) 
Major depressive disorder inpatients (n=14) 
Healthy controls (n=41) 
 
SEI & IAT Schizophrenia patients had lower explicit and 
implicit self-esteem. Those with persecutory 
delusions had higher self-esteem than those without. 
Smith et al. (2005) Grandiose delusions (n=20) (schizophrenia 
(n=12), schizoaffective disorder (n=4), bipolar 
affective disorder (n=4) 
Nonclinical controls (n=21) 
 
RSCQ, EST & SRIRT Grandiose group showed normal levels of self-
esteem, low depression and anxiety and no 
discrepancy between explicit and implicit self-
esteem. 
Valiente et al. (2011) Paranoid group (n=35) (schizophrenia 
paranoid type (n=18), schizophreniform 
disorder (n=5), schizoaffective disorder (n=3), 
delusional disorder (n=6), brief psychotic 
disorder (n=2), psychotic disorder not 
otherwise specified (n=1) 
Depressed group (n=35) (major depressive 
disorder (n=31), bipolar depression (n=4) 
Nonclinical control (n=44) 
 
E-SEI & GNAT Paranoid group did not differ from nonclinical 
controls on explicit self-esteem measure, however 
had lower implicit self-esteem, with a discrepancy 
between the two. 
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Self-esteem Concept and Measurement  
Self-esteem is defined as an evaluative component of the self-concept 
(Baumeister, 1998). According to Smith and Mackie (2007) “self-concept is what we 
think about the self and self-esteem is the positive or negative evaluations of the self, 
as in how we feel about it” (p.107). Based on this conceptual distinction between 
self-esteem and self-concept, only studies measuring self-esteem or self-evaluations 
were included in the review. The issues in conceptualising self-esteem are centred 
around three main areas: (a) its dimensionality, more specifically whether self-
esteem is a unitary or a multidimensional concept; (b) its stability, more specifically, 
is self-esteem a stable personality trait or a state dependant on context; and (c) the 
level of conscious and unconscious processes involved in making self-evaluations 
(Heatherton & Wyland, 2003). The challenge of measuring self-esteem has further 
highlighted the difficulty of defining the concept (Heatherton & Wyland, 2003).  
Rosenberg (1965) argued that self-esteem can be divided into global and specific 
components and he developed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (SEI) to measure 
the former. Most studies included in this review assessed self-esteem using the SEI. The 
SEI has been the most widely used measure of self-esteem in research (Demo, 1985). 
Nevertheless, the validity and reliability of the SEI have been questioned. First, it has 
been found to be influenced by mood (Andrews & Brown, 1993) suggesting that the 
measure may be capturing a state rather than a trait construct.  Second, some researchers 
argue that the instrument combines both positive and negative self-evaluation into a 
unitary measure, although demonstrated that they might be independent concepts 
(Andrews & Brown, 1993). As such the SEI has been used to obtain positive and 
negative self-esteem scores (Palmier-Claus, Dunn, Drake, Lewis, 2011). However, 
SELF-ESTEEM IN PERSECUTORY AND GRANDIOSE DELUSIONS 17 
 
 
according to Carmines and Zeller (1974) the two independent factors of the SEI reflect 
the response rather than different aspects of self-esteem, since those questions worded 
in a positive direction loaded on one factor and those worded in a negative direction 
loaded on the other factor. Furthermore, both factors demonstrated identical correlations 
with the global measure, suggesting they were measuring the same aspects of self-
esteem (Rosenberg, 1979). Therefore, it is more likely that the SEI is measuring the 
presence or absence of positive self-evaluations closely related to mood, rather than the 
presence of negative self-evaluations that may be more stable and more strongly held 
(Smith, B. et al., 2006). These conceptual and methodological issues have to be taken 
into consideration when reviewing the literature on self-esteem.  
Finally, the SEI and other similar measures, which rely on self-reports, 
conceptualise self-esteem as a conscious process (Heatherton & Wyland, 2003). Implicit 
self-esteem has been demonstrated as a concept distinct from explicit self-esteem 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Instruments thought to measure implicit self-esteem do 
not rely on self-report but infer self-esteem from individuals’ responses such as reaction 
times or memory biases. It has been suggested that unlike explicit measures, which may 
capture how individuals wish to present themselves, the implicit measures may be more 
reliable, although the evidence for this is mixed (Heatherton & Wyland, 2003). 
Explicit Self-esteem 
Eighteen studies assessed global self-esteem with the SEI and can be divided into 
correlational and case-control studies. 
Correlational studies. Eight studies investigated the relationship between self-
esteem and the severity of paranoid delusions in samples of individuals with psychosis. 
Since self-esteem, as measured with the SEI, was demonstrated to be closely related to 
mood, it is important to control for the confounding effects of depression. Consistent 
with the defence theory, Moritz, Werner, and von Collani (2006) found that higher self-
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esteem was associated with greater paranoid delusions, when depression was controlled 
for. However, this study was rated as low in quality due to having poor external 
validity, a small sample and a lack of power to detect a clinically meaningful effect.  
Four studies found lower self-esteem was associated with greater paranoid 
delusions, however, this finding was not significant once depression was controlled for 
(Garety et al., 2012; Humphreys & Barrowclough, 2006; Jones, Hansen, Moskvina, 
Kingdon, & Turkington, 2010; Smith, B. et al., 2006). According to Jones et al. (2010), 
the mediating effect of self-esteem through depression is still in line with the emotion-
consistent accounts. However, Jones et al.’s (2010) sample were individuals with a 
diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia resistant to medication’, which is not a representative group 
of individuals experiencing psychosis. They may have also experienced lower self-
esteem and depression secondary to their untreated symptoms. In contrast, one study of 
high quality found that lower self-esteem was associated with greater paranoid 
delusions, even when depression was controlled for, suggesting a direct and 
independent role for self-esteem (Romm et al., 2011). Furthermore, although Garety et 
al. (2012) and Smith, B. et al. (2006) did not demonstrate an independent effect of low 
self-esteem as measured with the SEI, they did find an independent effect of negative 
self-evaluations on paranoid delusions, by employing another measure. This will be 
discussed later in the review.  
Moritz et al. (2010) found no association between paranoid delusions and self-
esteem over time. It is plausible that if delusions serve as a defence, self-esteem will be 
maintained resulting in this lack of association between the two (Jones et al., 2010). 
However, Moritz, Klinge, et al. did not make adequate adjustments for the main 
confounders in their analysis, subsequently resulting in poor internal validity. A more 
methodologically sound longitudinal study, conducted over 18 months, compared the 
relationships between the two variables across four time points (Drake et al., 2004). 
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This study recruited a large representative sample of 257 individuals with psychosis. 
Furthermore, the participants were individuals experiencing a first episode of psychosis, 
whose self-esteem is less likely to be influenced by the secondary processes common in 
those experiencing long term mental health difficulties (Birchwood, Todd, & Jackson, 
1998; Drake et al., 2004).  Although the association between self-esteem and paranoia 
was not always demonstrated, when an association was found, lower self-esteem was 
independently related to greater paranoia. These findings provide some evidence in 
support of the emotion-consistent account. However, they also suggest the relationship 
between self-esteem and paranoid delusions is not stable and that there might be other 
important factors impacting over time and not captured by cross-sectional studies.  
Three studies demonstrated a positive association between high self-esteem and 
GDs (Jones et al., 2010; Moritz, Klinge, et al., 2010; Smith, B. et al., 2006). Although 
Jones et al. (2010) and Moritz, Klinge, et al. (2009) did not control for mood, which 
weakened the internal validity, Smith, B. et al. (2006) found that this association was 
related to mood, more particularly to the absence of depression. Nevertheless, although 
this is consistent with the emotion-consistent account, correlational studies cannot shed 
light on the direction of causality. Therefore, it is also possible that GDs are serving a 
defensive function, subsequently resulting in higher self-esteem (Knowles, McCarthy-
Jones & Rowse, 2011). Similar to studies of paranoid delusions, the relationship 
between high self-esteem and GDs was not present when the variables were assessed 
longitudinally, suggesting that this relationship may not be stable but dependent on 
other factors (Jones et al., 2010).  
Case-control studies. Although correlational studies employed participants with 
a range and continuum of psychosis symptoms, enabling the investigation of the 
severity of paranoid delusions and its relationship with self-esteem, they did not include 
control groups. Including a nonclinical control group, and more importantly a non-
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psychotic psychiatric group, ensures more confidence in any differences between the 
groups being due to the experience of delusions. Ten studies selected individuals who 
were experiencing paranoid delusions and investigated whether their level of self-
esteem differed to that of a control group. Two studies found higher self-esteem in 
participants with paranoid delusions when compared to nonclinical controls (Fornelis-
Ambrojo & Garety, 2009; McCulloch, Clare, Howard, & Peters, 2006). However, 
researchers failed to control for the confounding influence of mood on self-esteem. 
Therefore, it is possible that these samples experienced better mood and less depression. 
Similarly, two studies found lower self-esteem in those with paranoid delusions but 
failed to control for mood (Lincoln, Mehl, Exner, Lindenmeyer, & Rief, 2009; Vazquez, 
Diez-Alegria, Hernandez-Lloreda, & Moreno, 2008). Out of six studies that did control 
for depression, three demonstrated that although self-esteem was lower in participants 
with paranoid delusions when compared to nonclinical controls, it correlated with both 
depression and anxiety (Combs et al., 2009; MacKinnon, Newman-Taylor, & Stopa, 
2011; McKay et al., 2007) and this effect disappeared after controlling for depression 
(McKay, et al., 2007). On the other hand, three studies found that lower self-esteem in 
individuals with paranoid delusions remained after controlling for depression (Kesting, 
Mehl, Rief, & Lincoln, 2011; Mehl, Rief, Ziegler, Müller, & Lincoln, 2010; Moritz, 
Werner, et al., 2006). There is more evidence in support of the emotion-consistent 
accounts of paranoid delusions although it is not clear whether the role of self-esteem is 
mediated through depression or more direct.  
Alternative measures of explicit self-esteem. Some researchers have employed 
instruments other than the SEI to measure explicit self-esteem and have obtained mixed 
findings (Freeman, Garety, Fowler, et al., 1998; Lincoln, Mehl, et al., 2010; Smith, N. et 
al., 2005; Valiente et al., 2011; Vazquez et al., 2008). These studies were of lower 
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quality and had methodological limitations such as poor external validity, low power or 
issues affecting their internal validity. 
Bentall, Rowse, Shryane, et al. (2009) used the Self-Esteem Rating Scale 
(SERS; Nugent & Thomas, 1993), which was validated in individuals with psychosis 
(Gureje, Harvey, & Herrman, 2004) and found low self-esteem in their sample of 
individuals with paranoid delusions to be part of the wider “pessimistic explanatory 
style” independent of mood. Bentall, Rowse, Shryane, et al.’s (2009) study employed a 
large transdiagnostic sample of 88 participants with paranoid delusions, including 
individuals with major depression who were experiencing paranoid delusions. As such, 
their sample was more representative of individuals experiencing this type of delusion, 
ensuring better external validity and allowing more confidence in interpreting the 
findings. Therefore, it could be concluded that studies employing alternative 
measurements of self-esteem to the SEI, although very limited, also provide more sound 
evidence in support of the emotion-consistent account of persecutory delusions. 
Implicit Self-esteem 
The defence theories hypothesise that although individuals experiencing 
grandiose and/or persecutory delusions might have normal or high explicit self-esteem, 
their implicit self-esteem will be low (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994).  However, 
the interpretations of implicit measures by different researchers have varied and it is 
highly questionable whether some measures employed are actually tapping into the 
unconscious feelings about the self. For example, the Emotional Stroop Task (EST; 
Stroop, 1935) used by Kinderman (1994) measures how long participants take to 
respond to emotional words of personal description. However, the EST was developed 
for use in research on depression and it is unclear whether it is measuring implicit self-
esteem or depression (MacKinnon et al., 2001). 
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According to MacKinnon et al. (2009), one measure which is thought to be the 
most reliable in measuring implicit self-esteem is the self-esteem Implicit Association 
Test (SE-IAT; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). This instrument measures the 
association between the target concepts self or other and attribute concepts positive or 
negative. The nonclinical population shows a bias of responding quicker when self and 
positive words are presented together. Studies investigating implicit self-esteem and 
paranoia using the SE-IAT have yielded inconsistent findings,  and most of these 
studies were rated as low quality (MacKinnon et al., 2009; Mehl, et al., 2010; McKay et 
al, 2007; Moritz, Werner, et al, 2006; Valiente et al., 2011). Kesting et al.’s (2011) 
study, which was rated moderate in quality (due to having a relatively large sample, 
more power to detect clinically meaningful effect and scoring high on reporting) found 
that people with persecutory delusions had normal implicit self-esteem, comparable to 
nonclinical controls, failing to support the defence theory. There is a need for better 
quality studies and more valid measures in order to more reliably investigate the 
defensive role of self-esteem in delusions.  
Explicit and Implicit Self-esteem Discrepancy 
Defence theories argue that if delusions are successful in protecting individuals 
from low self-esteem entering consciousness then their explicit self-esteem should be 
higher than implicit self-esteem. Some authors have suggested that low explicit self-
esteem does not necessarily disprove this hypothesis, as long as implicit self-esteem is 
lower than explicit self-esteem (Moritz, Klinge, et al., 2009). Bentall, Corcoran, et al. 
(2001) revised their original defence theory and proposed that defence may not always 
be completely successful and that different individuals may vary in their ability to 
defend themselves from low self-esteem. This “weak” version of defence theory allows 
for the explicit self-esteem to be low, as well as for smaller discrepancies between the 
explicit and implicit self-esteem (McKay et al., 2007, p.19).  
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Four studies measured the discrepancy between explicit and implicit self-esteem 
in individuals with persecutory delusions and yielded inconsistent results. Two low 
quality studies found the discrepancy, consistent with the defence theory (Valiente et 
al., 2011; McKay et al., 2007). In contrast, two studies found no discrepancy in their 
samples with persecutory delusions (Kesting et al., 2011; Vazquez et al., 2008). Kesting 
et al.’s (2011) study was considered to be more methodologically sound (due to having 
bigger samples and more power to detect clinically meaningful effect). Therefore, 
although very limited, the evidence to date investigating the discrepancy between 
explicit and implicit self-esteem supports the emotion-consistent account of persecutory 
delusions. The only study measuring explicit and implicit self-esteem in individuals 
with GDs did not demonstrate a discrepancy (Smith, N. et al., 2005). However, this 
study had poor external validity and power, and it failed to control for mood thus 
resulting in poor internal validity. Therefore, no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Current and Remitted Delusions 
One prediction of the defence hypothesis is that there will be a difference 
between those individuals currently experiencing persecutory delusions and those 
whose delusions are in remission. More specifically, individuals with current delusions 
will have higher explicit self-esteem than individuals whose delusions are in remission, 
although their implicit self-esteem will be the same. Six studies that investigated this 
line of defence are also inconclusive. For example, some studies found no discrepancies 
between explicit and implicit self-esteem in either group (Kesting et al., 2011; Vazquez, 
2008), some found that those with current delusions had lower implicit self-esteem 
(McKay et al., 2007) whilst others found they had either lower explicit (Mehl, et al., 
2010) or higher explicit self-esteem (Moritz, Werner, et al., 2006). One of the studies 
that failed to find discrepancies in either of the groups and subsequently failed to 
support the defence theory, was of a better overall quality (Kesting et al., 2011). 
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Furthermore, there was no difference in explicit self-esteem levels between participants 
with current and remitted paranoid delusions in the more clinically representative study 
by Bentall, Rowse, Kinderman, et al. (2008), and the association between low self-
esteem and paranoia was demonstrated in both groups, highlighting a direct role of low 
self-esteem.  
Some researchers investigated changes in delusions over time and their 
relationship with self-esteem. They found no change in self-esteem as a result of a 
decrease in conviction of persecutory delusions (Freeman, Garety, Fowler, et al., 1998) 
or as a result of the onset of a paranoid episode (Thewissen, Bentall, Oorschot, et al., 
2011). Instead, participants continued to experience low self-esteem. This is not 
consistent with the defence theory, which would predict an improvement in self-esteem 
as the paranoid episode commences, or a decrease as the conviction lessens. Therefore, 
findings to date investigating this line of defence hypothesis do not provide evidence in 
support of a defence.  
Poor Me and Bad Me Paranoia 
In order to explain inconsistent findings in the studies investigating self-esteem 
and paranoid delusions, some researchers have proposed two distinct types of 
psychological processes which may underlie the development of these delusions. 
Trower and Chadwick (1995) distinguished between individuals who felt their 
persecutions were deserved and who blamed themselves (bad me paranoia) and those 
who felt their persecutions were undeserved (poor me paranoia). Research showed that 
participants who thought their persecutions were deserved had more anxiety and 
depression and lower self-esteem than those who thought their persecutions were 
undeserved (Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001) and that this finding was not 
completely due to depression (Chadwick, Trower, Juusti-Butler, & Maguire, 2005). 
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However, these studies had small samples and possibly not representative of the 
population from which they were recruited.  
A better quality study with a larger and more representative sample, found that 
those who felt that their delusions were deserved are more likely to have negative self-
esteem (Bentall, Rowse, Shryane, et al., 2009). The authors proposed that deservedness 
may be better conceptualised as a dimension since not many participants had extremely 
low or extremely high scores, and therefore could not be grouped into poor me and bad 
me categories. It is likely that this phenomenon may impact on self-esteem and 
therefore may have confounded the results in reviewed studies, leading to contradictory 
findings. Therefore, it may be important to include deservingness as a confounder when 
investigating self-esteem in this population in future. 
Positive and Negative Self-esteem 
Some researchers argue that self-esteem may be better conceptualised as 
consisting of two independent constructs – positive and negative self-esteem. Two 
studies found a significant association between persecutory delusions and negative self-
esteem but this association disappeared after controlling for depression, anxiety and 
general symptoms of psychosis (Humphreys & Barrowclough, 2006; MacKinnon et al., 
2011). Four studies showed that levels of negative self-esteem significantly predicted 
severity of paranoia, independent of depression (Bentall, Rowse, Kinderman, et al., 
2008; Garety et al., 2012; Palmier-Claus et al., 2011; Smith, B. et al., 2006). However, 
Palmier-Claus et al. (2011) employed the SEI to measure self-esteem and since the 
positive and negative factors of the SEI appear to measure the presence and absence of 
positive self-esteem, this tool may not be valid in assessing negative self-esteem.  
Fowler et al. (2006) developed the Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS). This 
instrument assesses both positive and negative evaluations of self and others, and 
according to the authors, more reliably reflects schema constructs relevant to psychosis 
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population. Smith, B. et al. (2006) found that those individuals with more negative self-
evaluations had paranoid delusions of greater severity even after controlling for the 
effects of depression and low self-esteem. In contrast, individuals with GDs of greater 
severity had less negative self-evaluations. These results were replicated and extended 
in a large sample of 301 participants with psychosis, which included 100 participants 
from Smith, B. et al.’s (2006) study (Garety, et al., 2012). However, the independent 
relationship between negative self-evaluations and delusions was only found for 
persecutory delusions, suggesting that less negative self-evaluations in individuals with 
GDs may be mood dependent. It is therefore possible that either GDs or elated mood 
may serve as a defence or a coping strategy, protecting individuals from negative self-
evaluations. 
One study investigated whether negative self-esteem predicted GDs. As a 
measure of negative self-esteem Ben-Zeev, Morris, Swendsen, and Granholm (2012) 
employed the negative self-evaluations subscale of the SERS-SF (short versions of the 
SERS). In addition, they assessed the occurrence of delusions with the Experience 
Sampling Method (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987), an ecological method of 
collecting repeated self-report measurements in the context of daily life, as prompted by 
an electronic device. The measurements were taken over a week long period, four times 
a day, ensuring multiple data points. This method has good validity and reliability 
(Myin-Germeys, Nicolson, & Delespaul, 2001). Ben-Zeev et al. (2012) found that 
negative self-esteem predicted the occurrence of GDs in a sample of 130 individuals 
with psychosis. Therefore, research exploring positive and negative self-esteem to date 
strongly implicates negative self-esteem with both persecutory and GDs. 
Fluctuations in Self-esteem 
Most traditional theories of self-esteem have argued that self-esteem is a stable 
personality trait and that changes in self-esteem can only be very small and gradual 
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(Heatherton & Wyland, 2003). Nevertheless, some theories have challenged this view 
and have conceptualised self-esteem as a context specific state, sensitive to and highly 
dependent on social situations, evaluations by others and mood (Kernis, 1993). 
Longitudinal studies have allowed the researchers to explore the more dynamic nature 
of self-esteem and suggested that fluctuations in self-esteem may be a better predictor of 
the occurrence of paranoia than the current level of self-esteem (Thewissen, Myin-
Germeys, et al., 2007). Since the “weak” defence theory postulates that individuals may 
not always be successful in avoiding negative feelings, and that their success may be 
dependent on many external factors, it also predicts that self-esteem in people with 
persecutory delusions will be unstable (Thewissen, Bentall, Lecomte, van Os, & Myin-
Germeys, 2008).  
Three studies explored the stability of self-esteem. Erickson and Lysaker (2012) 
employed the SEI to measure state and trait self-esteem at eight time points over a 
period of six months. The results demonstrated that those individuals with lower trait 
self-esteem had greater paranoid delusions and that decreases in self-esteem predicted 
increases in paranoia. However, there was no association between the instability of self-
esteem and severity of paranoia. Since Palmier-Claus et al. (2011) found that only 
fluctuations in positive but not negative self-esteem, as measured using the SEI, 
predicted an increase in paranoia, it may be that the SEI as a unitary measure of self-
esteem is not sensitive in detecting this instability. 
Thewissen, Bentall, Lecomte, et al. (2008) used the ESM, which required 
participants to self-report on their feelings about self as well as their experience of 
paranoia, ten times a day, over six consecutive days.  The study explored state and trait 
aspects of both self-esteem and paranoia, whilst controlling for the confounding effects 
of depression. The findings showed that lower and more unstable self-esteem was 
associated with higher trait paranoia. Furthermore, they demonstrated that momentary 
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decreases in self-esteem predicted momentary increases in state paranoia. The sample of 
this study was representative of the population, and their method of measuring self-
esteem in daily life enabled researchers to gather more data (up to 60 data points per 
person) as well as to investigate more momentary daily and even hourly fluctuations. 
This method is likely to be more sensitive to measuring self-esteem instability. The 
finding that momentary decreases in self-esteem predicted paranoia was replicated and 
extended in Thewissen, Bentall, Oorschot, et al.’s (2011) study. They also investigated 
possible confounding effects of depression, anxiety and hallucinations. Since different 
experiences of psychosis often co-exist, this increases confidence in the findings 
obtained. Therefore, taken together the research thus far strongly suggests that decreases 
in self-esteem and its fluctuations predict the onset of paranoia. The instability of self-
esteem in individuals with paranoid delusions could explain the contradictory findings 
obtained from cross-sectional studies. 
Co-morbidity of Grandiose and Persecutory Delusions 
Green et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between self-esteem and the 
content of paranoid delusions and showed that participants who described having more 
power and grandiose ideas had higher self-esteem. This implies that GDs may interact 
with persecutory beliefs and impact on the level of self-esteem. Indeed, there is a high 
co-occurrence between grandiose and persecutory delusions, which makes it difficult to 
separate their independent effects (Garety et al., 2012). Therefore, studies investigating 
this co-occurrence, such as Smith, B. et al. (2006) and Garety et al. (2012), are more 
likely to shed light on the conflicting theories. These studies strongly suggest that 
persecutory delusions are associated with lower self-esteem and more negative self-
evaluations, whilst GDs are associated with higher self-esteem and less negative self-
evaluations. Furthermore, Garety et al. (2012) compared individuals who were only 
experiencing GDs with individuals who were only experiencing paranoid delusions, and 
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demonstrated that those with GDs had significantly higher self-esteem. Individuals 
experiencing both types of delusions had self-esteem levels falling in between the other 
two groups. Employing three groups differing in the type of delusion and possibly being 
more representative of each other, increases the confidence that the findings were due to 
different processes involved in these delusions. Similarly, Candido and Romney (1990) 
found that their group with paranoid delusions without depression had higher self-
esteem and significantly more GDs when compared to a group with paranoid 
depression. This evidence highlights the importance of investigating the co-morbidity of 
these two types of delusion and provides another plausible explanation for why studies 
to date might have yielded inconsistent findings. 
Social Self-esteem 
In a recent review of GDs, Knowles et al. (2011) reviewed the literature on 
affective and cognitive processes, including the role of self-esteem. According to these 
authors, lack of support for the defence model of GDs could be due to focusing on self-
esteem as a non-relational concept. In line with this, Smith, B. et al. (2006) proposed 
that GDs could be maintained not only by the positive self-evaluations but also by the 
negative evaluations of others, which interact together to give an impression of a higher 
social position. Smith, B. et al. found some evidence of the relationship between 
negative evaluations of others and GDs. However, their findings were not replicated by 
Garety et al. (2012) who found instead that GDs were predicted by higher positive 
evaluations of others. It could be that negative evaluations of others do not provide a 
reliable and valid measure of self-esteem as a social concept. Indeed, one study of GDs 
that employed the SERS, which is thought to measure how individuals might feel about 
themselves in relation to other people, found that negative self-esteem predicted GDs 
(Ben-Zeev et al., 2012). This might be a more valid measure of social self-esteem. 
Future research exploring self-esteem in persecutory and grandiose delusions should 
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investigate different aspects of self-esteem such as interpersonal self-esteem, as well as 
develop more reliable measurements of these concepts. 
Causal Role of Self-esteem 
Most of the studies in this review are correlational and cross-sectional, therefore 
making it difficult to draw inferences about the causal role of self-esteem in the 
development and maintenance of delusions. The findings from the longitudinal studies 
demonstrate that decreases in self-esteem and negative self-esteem precede the 
occurrence of paranoid delusions and that negative self-esteem precedes the occurrence 
of GDs, suggesting that self-esteem contributes to the onset of delusions. Fowler et al. 
(2012) investigated the direction of effect between self-esteem and paranoid delusions 
by re-analysing data of 301 participants with psychosis collected over a 12 month 
period (Garety et al., 2012). They employed Structural Equation Modelling
2
 to explore 
which directional pathways fitted the model best, using both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal designs. This method strongly indicated that negative cognition (including 
self-esteem) was impacting on paranoid delusions, with only a very weak relationship in 
the opposite direction. The authors suggested that these effects were most likely to be 
causal but advised caution, since this study was still correlational rather than 
experimental in nature. Some researchers have developed a novel research paradigm 
using virtual reality, which has enabled experimental investigations of causal and 
maintaining factors in the occurrence of paranoia in nonclinical populations (Valmaggia 
et al., 2007; Freeman, Pugh, et al., 2008). This method may be valuable in exploring the 
causal and maintaining role of self-esteem in delusions in future. 
Discussion 
The research in the field of self-esteem and paranoid and grandiose delusions 
has yielded contradictory findings although overall there has been no strong evidence 
xxxxxxxxxxxx                                                        
2 Method of confirmatory data analysis, testing association between variables and direction of association. 
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for the defence hypothesis. Larger studies with better external validity and more power 
have provided evidence consistent with the emotion-consistent hypothesis, suggesting 
that the role of self-esteem is more direct and non-defensive. Research has demonstrated 
that low self-esteem and negative self-evaluations are closely related to paranoid 
delusions. Furthermore, longitudinal studies have provided evidence that fluctuations, 
as well as decreases in self-esteem predict the occurrence of paranoid delusions. 
Nevertheless, research on GDs is very scarce, making it harder to draw 
conclusions about this type of delusion. Although they appear to be related to high self-
esteem and less negative self-evaluations, the evidence to date suggests that this may be 
mood dependant. Since negative self-esteem has been found to predict the occurrence of 
GDs, it may still be possible that GDs serve a defensive function or are a consequence 
of a defensive strategy such as elated mood. Focusing on self-esteem as a relational and 
social concept may shed more light on this. Furthermore, high co-morbidity of paranoid 
and GDs may have contaminated the findings and yielded inconsistencies. Therefore, 
future studies should investigate independent effects of these delusions whilst 
controlling for a number of confounders or contributing factors such as mood and 
deservedness. With the development of virtual reality paradigms the evidence for the 
causal and maintaining role of self-esteem in development of delusions may flourish.  
This review has important implications for clinical practice. It strongly suggests 
that the psychological care offered to individuals with paranoid delusions should 
include self-esteem interventions. Although it is important to provide individuals with 
strategies and opportunities to increase their self-esteem, it may be more pertinent to 
focus on more stable negative self-evaluations, especially in the context of anxiety and 
depression. Furthermore, psychological interventions should include work on self-
esteem regulation, and strategies to manage both decreases and increases in self-esteem. 
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It is likely that this would also be relevant for individuals experiencing GDs, however, 
more high quality research is needed to confirm this. 
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Appendix A. Quality Appraisal Tool 
Question Quality measure Quality rating 
tool 
Answer 
1. Is the hypothesis/aim/objective of the study clearly described? Reporting Downs & Black Yes 
No 
2. Are the main outcomes to be measured clearly described in the Introduction or 
Methods sections? If the main outcomes are first mentioned in the Results section, the 
question should be answered no. 
Reporting Downs & Black Yes 
No 
3. Are the characteristics of the patients included in the study clearly described? In 
cohort studies and trials, inclusion and/or exclusion criteria should be given. In case-
control studies, a case-definition and the source for controls should be given. 
Reporting Downs & Black Yes 
No 
4. Are the distributions of principal confounders in each group of subjects to be 
compared clearly described? A list of principal confounders is provided. 
Reporting Downs & Black Yes 
Partially 
No 
5. Are the main findings of the study clearly described? Simple outcome data should be 
reported for all major findings so that the reader can check the major analyses and 
conclusions. 
Reporting Downs & Black Yes 
No 
6. Does the study provide estimates of the random variability in the data for the main 
outcomes? The standard error, standard deviation or confidence intervals should be 
reported. 
Reporting Downs & Black Yes 
No 
7. Have actual probability values been reported (e.g. 0.035 rather than <0.05) for the 
main outcomes except where the probability value is less than 0.001? 
Reporting Downs & Black Yes 
No 
8. Were the subjects asked to participate in the study representative from of the entire 
population from which they were recruited? The study must identify the source 
population and describe how the patients were selected. Patients would be 
representative if they comprised the entire source population, an unselected sample of 
consecutive patients, or a random sample.   
External validity Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
9. Were those subjects who were prepared to participate representative of the entire 
population from which they were recruited? The proportion of those asked who agreed 
External validity Downs & Black Yes 
No 
  
to participate should be stated. Validation that the sample was representative would 
include demonstrating that the main confounding factors was the same in the study 
sample and the source population. 
Unable to 
determine 
10. Were the statistical tests used to assess the main outcomes appropriate? The statistical 
techniques used must be appropriate to the data. For example non-parametric 
methods should be used for small sample sizes. Where little statistical analysis has 
been undertaken but where there is no evidence of bias, the question should be 
answered yes. If the distribution of the data is not described it must be assumed that 
the estimates used were appropriate and the question should be answered yes. 
Internal validity-
bias 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
11. Were the main outcome measures used accurate (valid and reliable)? For studies 
where the outcome measures are clearly described, the question should be answered 
yes. For studies which refer to other work or that demonstrates the outcome measures 
are accurate, the question should be answered as yes. 
Internal validity- 
bias 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
12. Were the participants and controls recruited from the same population? Patients for all 
comparison groups should be selected from the same population. This question is 
answered unable to determine where there is no information concerning the source of 
patients included in the study. 
Internal validity- 
confounding 
(selection bias) 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
13. Were the participants and controls recruited over the same period of time? For a study 
which does not specify the time period over which patients were recruited, the 
question should be answered as unable to determine. 
Internal validity- 
confounding 
(selection bias) 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
14. Was there adequate adjustment for confounding in the analyses from which the main 
findings were drawn? The question should be answered no if the effect of the main 
confounders was not investigated or confounding was demonstrated but no adjustment 
was made in the final analysis. 
Internal validity- 
confounding 
(selection bias 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
15. Did the study have sufficient power to detect a clinically important effect where the 
probability value for a difference being due to chance is less than 5%?  
Power Downs & Black Yes 
No 
 
 
  
Appendix B. Studies Excluded from the Review 
 
 Summary of Excluded studies 
 
Study Sample Self-esteem measure Findings 
Bowins & Shugar (1998)  Inpatients with psychosis (n=47) 
(schizophrenia, n=21; schizoaffective 
disorder, manic episode & major 
depressive episode, n=5) 
Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory,  
SRS   
 
 
 
 
Content of delusions reflected global 
self-esteem and self-regard. 
Individuals with persecutory delusions 
rated persecutory delusions as less 
comfortable than other delusions. 
Warman & Lysaker (2011) Outpatients with schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder (n=30) 
MSEI (global self-esteem score) There was a relationship between low 
self-esteem and persecutory beliefs. 
There was no relationship between 
self-esteem and grandiosity. 
Note. SRS= Self-Rating Scale, MSEI=Multidimensional Self-esteem Inventory 
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SECTION 2: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH REPORT 
 
First Person Accounts of Grandiose Beliefs: A Grounded Theory Approach 
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Abstract 
Objectives. Grandiose delusions (GD) are one of the most common types of delusions, 
held with the greatest conviction, yet there is a lack of clinical and theoretical 
understanding. Current models of GDs are based on limited research and clinical 
observations. This study aimed to develop a theory of the development and maintenance 
of GDs which was empirically grounded in the individuals’ lived experience. 
Design and Methods. The study explored first person accounts of their experience of 
grandiose beliefs. Seven individuals were interviewed using a Semi-Structured 
Interview Schedule. The Grounded Theory method was applied when collecting and 
analyzing data. 
Results. The developed theory of GDs centered on the core category Expanding Sense 
of Self. Four closely related categories described processes involved in the experience of 
self-growth: Higher Consciousness, Search for Healing, Re-gaining Control and 
Element of Truth and Validation. 
Conclusions. The findings suggested a number of processes may be involved in the 
development and maintenance of GDs. An expanding sense of self was central and 
viewed by the participants as a positive and healing experience. There also appeared to 
be pathways which differed between as well as within individuals, including those 
linking grandiose and paranoid beliefs. Future research should explore these further. 
Clinical implications are considered, in particular there is a need for mental health 
professionals to recognise the potential for healing, which may occur during the 
experience of self as special in the context of psychosis. 
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First person accounts of grandiose beliefs: A grounded theory approach 
Grandiose delusions (GDs) have been defined as false beliefs featuring an inflated 
sense of worth (APA, 2000). For example, individuals with this type of delusion may 
believe they are someone special or famous, that they have special powers or that they 
are related to someone famous, despite these beliefs not being shared by others. GDs are 
one of the most common types of delusion and are held with greater conviction than 
other delusions (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 1999). GDs are most prevalent in 
bipolar disorder and schizophrenia (Appelbaum et al., 1999) and have traditionally been 
viewed as abnormal and meaningless symptoms of mental illness (Jaspers, 1913; 
Kraeplin, 1899).  
More recently there has been a move away from seeing delusions as abnormal but 
rather as part of a continuum with typical beliefs found in the general population.  
(Bentall, Jackson, & Pilgrim, 1988; Oltmanns, 1988; Strauss, 1969). As such, they may 
be transient and differ in distress, preoccupation and conviction. Indeed, Peters, Joseph 
and Garety (1999) found that in their sample of 272 individuals without psychiatric 
diagnosis 43% reported some grandiose beliefs. This conceptual shift inspired research 
into the psychological processes involved in the development and maintenance of 
delusions. Persecutory or paranoid delusions have been the focus of much psychological 
research in the last decade, yet for GDs there is a lack of both clinical and theoretical 
understanding. Furthermore, the development of successful psychological interventions 
for GDs lags behind those for persecutory delusions (Kuipers et al., 1997; Knowles, 
McCarthy-Jones and Rowse, 2011).  There is a need to better understand the processes 
underlying GDs in order to develop more effective ways of helping individuals who are 
distressed by them.   
The two existing theories of GDs emphasise the experience of emotion. Defence 
theory suggests that GDs, together with mania, serve a function of protecting the 
FIRST PERSON ACCOUNTS OF GRANDIOSE BELIEFS 51 
 
 
individual from distressing feelings, cognitions and low self-esteem (Neale, 1988). 
During the experience of GDs it is proposed that there is a reduced discrepancy between 
actual and ideal self-representations, which prevents distressing feelings and cognitions 
from entering consciousness. In contrast, emotion-consistent theory postulates that GDs 
build on positive mood and preserved areas of normal or high self-esteem (Smith, N., 
Freeman & Kuipers, 2005). Consistent with the second theory, two large scale studies 
demonstrated that GDs were associated with higher self-esteem and less anxiety and 
depression (Garety et al., 2012; Smith, B. et al., 2006). However, whilst higher self-
esteem was associated with GDs, the direction of causality could not be assumed. For 
example, it is possible that if GDs successfully serve a defensive function, they may 
result in increased self-esteem (Knowles et al., 2011).  
Following a review of the relevant literature in the field of GDs, Knowles et al. 
(2011) concluded that although there appeared to be more evidence in support of the 
emotion-consistent account, it was limited. Knowles et al. (2011) proposed a 
preliminary model of GDs. Whilst the model shows two different pathways leading to 
GDs, the emotion-consistent pathway is given more focus and weight. The authors 
proposed that the main pathway starts with a trigger event such as goal achievement, 
which leads to a changed internal state, for example, an increase in mood or self-esteem. 
The subsequent search for meaning and the appraisal of this internal experience is 
proposed to result in the formation of GDs. Factors such as early life events, cognitive 
biases and the use of rumination and mental imagery are also considered to impact on 
the development of beliefs. The alternative pathway was postulated to begin with a 
negative life event which threatens the individual’s self-esteem, leading to the 
experience of GDs through defensive processes.  
GDs often co-occur with paranoid delusions making it difficult to investigate 
independent processes underlying each delusion (Garety et al., 2012). The model of 
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GDs developed by Knowles et al. (2011) attempts to explain how paranoid and 
grandiose delusions may be connected, highlighting the importance of self-esteem 
fluctuations in this process. Due to negative fluctuations in self-esteem, individuals 
experiencing GDs may start to fear that others desire their special identity, power or 
knowledge, subsequently developing secondary paranoid delusions. Similarly, due to 
positive fluctuations in self-esteem, individuals with paranoid delusions may start to 
think they are being persecuted because they are special, subsequently developing 
secondary GDs.  
A close interplay between grandiose and persecutory beliefs is highlighted in first 
person accounts of psychosis (e.g. Chadwick, 2010). A psychologist Peter Chadwick 
describes an experience of grandiose beliefs, which he feels developed as a way to 
explain feelings of paranoia. Chadwick distinguishes between this “defensively 
compensatory and self-inflating” experience (Chadwick, 2010, p.69) and a separate 
positive experience of self as special. He describes the latter as an intense spiritual 
experience during which he felt as if he was reborn, gaining a new sense of self and 
having a purpose. The emotions such as anger and fear, which were previously powerful 
and overwhelming, became inactive. Instead, he experienced creativity, love and 
connection with God. Although both experiences followed increasing paranoia they 
resulted in a different quality of a grandiose experience.  
Personal narratives can provide rich information and insights into complex 
processes and interest has grown in the lived experience of individuals with delusions. 
According to Hornstein (2013), first person narratives not only demonstrate limitations 
of psychiatry but also offer alternative explanations to be considered. It is becoming 
more widely recognised that the meaning that individuals make of their experiences is 
pertinent to understanding the phenomena studied and more likely to be clinically 
helpful than diagnostic criteria (Hornstein, 2013). Therefore, it is important to take into 
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account the narratives of individuals who have experienced delusions and to attempt to 
build an understanding of their beliefs collaboratively.  
In a series of studies, Rhodes and Jakes (2000, 2004, 2010) explored first person 
narratives of delusional beliefs. They suggested that the content of delusions reflected 
the fundamental life concerns of the individual (Rhodes & Jakes, 2000). For example, 
one participant, who believed he had special abilities and competence, described 
experiencing past academic failure and having brothers who had successful professional 
careers. His main life goals were further education and self-achievement. The authors 
concluded that although GDs could reflect a desire for achievement or power they did 
not necessarily serve as a defence against low self-esteem. Rhodes and Jakes also 
highlighted that their research was purely descriptive, exploring the content rather than 
the function and causality of delusions.  
Almost half of Rhodes and Jakes’ (2004) sample used metaphors which reflected 
the content of the delusions, to describe their experience either in the pre-delusional 
period or during an acute psychotic episode. For example, one participant, having seen a 
light in the sky assumed it was a spaceship.  He reported initially feeling light “as 
though in the Milky Way” (Rhodes & Jakes, 2004, p.9), followed by the formation of 
delusions surrounding alien life and his leadership in this.  The authors conceptualised 
delusions as thoughts about real experiences transformed by the metaphorical meaning, 
through the “fusion” of conceptual domains (Rhodes & Jakes, 2004, p.14).  
The interpersonal difficulties and negative emotions were main themes evident in 
many participants’ accounts of the onset of delusions and appeared to interact with the 
complex experience of perceptions and appraisals over time (Rhodes & Jakes, 2010). 
However, some participants described a very sudden onset of delusions, which seemed 
to come from nowhere. Although these participants reported experiencing interpersonal 
difficulties when prompted by the researchers, such difficulties were not significant in 
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their sense-making. However, the participants were experiencing delusions at the time 
of the study, which is likely to impact on their narratives and the significance they 
attribute to different events. Furthermore, if delusions serve a defensive function then 
the negative factors leading to their development may not be in the individual’s 
awareness at that time. Therefore, it may be important to include both individuals with 
current and individuals with remitted delusions when exploring first person narratives. 
Rhodes and Jakes’s studies mostly included participants with persecutory 
delusions; those describing GDs were significantly under represented. To date, no 
research specifically explores the experience of GDs or the subjective meaning that 
individuals attribute to GDs.  Furthermore, no study has directly explored first person 
explanations for the development of GDs.  The current study starts the process of 
developing a shared meaning of GDs by exploring how people make sense of this 
experience and asking participants directly what their explanations for these experiences 
are. It aims to construct a theory of the development and maintenance of GDs, which is 
empirically grounded in the experience of individuals who report experiencing these 
beliefs.  
Method 
The study employed a qualitative design using grounded theory methodology. The 
lack of theoretical understanding and empirical research on GDs meant that qualitative 
research was appropriate due to its exploratory nature. Furthermore, this design is 
appropriate for exploring first person accounts. A grounded theory approach was 
appropriate since it places the experience and the meaning individuals give to this 
experience at its centre, whilst attempting to generate a new theory. The original version 
of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) assumed that the researcher discovers a 
new theory by remaining objective and not bringing preconceptions and knowledge of 
other theories into the analytic process. This method has its roots in a realist 
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epistemology, proposing that there is a ‘true’ state of the world that can be discovered 
and reliably measured. However, the Social Constructionist version of grounded theory 
(Charmaz, 1990, 2006), which proposes the existence of multiple truths dependent on 
individual perceptions, recognises the difficulty for the researcher of remaining 
completely objective. According to Charmaz’ method, the researcher’s perceptions will 
influence the way he/she gathers and interprets the data, thereby facilitating the active 
construction of a new theory based on shared meaning. The current researcher’s 
epistemological view is consistent with social constructivism and the idea of multiple 
social realities. However, the ultimate purpose of grounded theory is to build a 
conceptual framework of a phenomenon, rather than to focus on interpreting the 
individuals’ meanings which would result in a diffuse theory (Breckenbridge, Elliott, & 
Nicol, 2012; Martin, 2006). The researcher therefore adopted the idea that any concepts 
developed would be shared by participants, although they may have different meanings 
(Glaser, 2004).   
Ethical Reviews 
Ethical approval was sought from the University Ethics Committee and a regional 
NHS Research Ethics Committee, since participants were recruited from both an NHS 
trust and the community.  Governance approval was sought from the University and 
from the NHS trust, which also included a review by a service user panel. The copies of 
these approvals can be found in Appendices C and D. Furthermore, a service user from 
the service user led organisation Bipolar UK was involved in the process of reviewing 
the research materials in order to check their relevance and acceptability.   
Recruitment 
Seven participants who experienced GDs were recruited, six of whom were 
recruited through Bipolar UK. The information about the research was emailed to 
service users on the local organisation’s mailing list, at two different time points, 
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October 2011 and September 2012. In addition, the researcher attended a service user 
meeting to talk about the study. One participant was recruited via a Community Mental 
Health Team (CMHT) by liaising with a care co-ordinator.  
Participants 
All participants who expressed an interest fulfilled the inclusion criteria and were 
able to take part in the study. The inclusion criteria were: 1) an experience of either past 
or current GDs, 2) an adequate command of the English language, and 3) an ability to 
provide informed consent and concentrate on the interview. The demographic 
characteristics of the sample can be found in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample (n=7) 
Characteristics Number 
Gender                               
  Male 
  Female 
Age                                     
  26-35 
  36-45 
  46-55 
Ethnicity                              
  White British 
Marital status                      
  Single 
  Separated 
  Divorced 
  Partner 
Education                           
  Left college without qualification 
  College level 
  Degree equivalent 
  BSc degree 
Employment                      
  Self-employed 
  Freelance 
  Voluntary 
  Unemployed 
  Other 
Diagnosis                           
  Bipolar disorder 
  Paranoid schizophrenia 
Length of illness                  
  Since childhood 
  18 years 
  10 years 
  18 months 
Medication  
 
3 
4 
 
2 
1 
4 
 
7 
 
2 
1 
1 
3 
 
2 
1 
1 
3 
 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
 
6 
1 
 
2 
1 
3 
1 
7 
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Measures 
Quantitative measures were employed in this study to screen potential participants 
for suitability and to obtain demographic and clinical information in order to 
contextualise the sample. See Appendix E for copies of measures. 
Screening measures. Past experience of GDs was confirmed using participants’ 
responses to two items on the short form of the Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI-21; 
Peters, Joseph, Day & Garety, 2004), which ask specifically about GDs
3
. The PDI-21 
has been validated in both general and clinical samples, showing good internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability (r=0.71) (Peters et al., 2004).  
A screening questionnaire specifically designed for this study assessed whether 
participants were able to take part. It included questions regarding suicidal ideation, 
substance misuse and psychotic experiences on the day of the interview, all factors 
which could have prevented them from concentrating or posed a significant risk.  
Demographic and clinical measures. A questionnaire was administered to obtain 
demographic data including diagnosis, history of psychotic episodes and details of 
prescribed medication.  
In order to obtain information regarding other delusional beliefs in addition to 
GDs the full PDI-21 was administered. All participants reported experiencing other 
types of delusional belief in addition to grandiosity. Most participants reported beliefs 
about persecution, suspiciousness, paranoid ideation, religiosity, paranormal beliefs and 
thought disturbance. A few participants also reported beliefs about negative self, 
depersonalisation, catastrophic ideation and ideation of reference. The participants 
varied in distress (scores 13-46), preoccupation (scores 21-46) and conviction (scores 
26-50) of delusional beliefs experienced. Furthermore, they differed in the total 
lviilviilviilvii                                                        
3 Item 6 – Do you ever feel as if you are, or destined to be someone very important? 
   Item 7 - Do you ever feel that you are a very special or unusual person? 
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delusional ideation experienced (68-154), with three participants scoring below and four 
scoring above the clinical population mean of 131 (Peters et al., 2004). 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
measures current levels of depression and anxiety. It has good reliability (Cronbach’s  
alpha=0.86) and was validated in a non-clinical sample (Crawford, Henry, Crombie & 
Taylor, 2001). The clinical cut-off score for both depression and anxiety is 11. 
Participants varied in their levels of depression and anxiety (Table 2).   
The Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (ASRM; Altman, Hedeker, Peterson, & 
Davis, 1997) was used to measure current levels of elated mood. This scale was 
demonstrated to have good test-retest reliability and a high correlation with the 
Clinician Administered Rating Scale for Mania (CARS-M; Altman, Hedeker, Janicak, 
Peterson, and Davis, 1994) (r=0.766). The clinical cut off score indicating hypomania or 
mania is six. The participants differed in their level of elated mood (Table 2). 
 
         Table 2 
          Clinical characteristics of the sample (n=7) 
Measure Score 
range 
Mean 
scores 
No. reaching 
clinical cut-off 
HADS Depression  0-12 9 2 
 
HADS Anxiety  
 
 
ASRM 
 
4-11 
 
 
0-10 
 
 
7 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
2 
              Note. HADS= Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, ASRM=   
              Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale, PDI-21= Peters Delusion Inventory 
 
Procedure 
Participants were given written information about the research and the consent 
forms (Appendix F and G). They were given an opportunity to discuss the study over 
the telephone or via email prior to meeting the researcher. Informed consent was 
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obtained on the day and the suitability of the participants was assessed using the 
screening measures. The demographic and clinical measures were administered prior to 
the interview. Participants were interviewed using a semi-structured interview schedule 
(SSIS) (Figure 1, for details please see Appendix H). The interviews were 
approximately 45 - 90 minutes long and were tape-recorded.  
 
Figure 1. Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
 
Analysis  
Each interview was transcribed and analysed in turn using the grounded theory 
method (Charmaz, 2006). The following is a description of the procedures and methods 
that were employed during this process. 
Coding. The analytical process began with a line-by-line or incident-by-incident 
analysis of the participants’ stories. This involved identifying low-level codes that 
described, labelled and summarised participants’ words and actions (for an example see 
Appendix I1). In order to ensure that the developing codes were closely grounded in the 
Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
Please tell me a little bit about your experience of strongly believing that you were 
very special, unusual or important. 
1. Aim – to explore the content and the experience of grandiose delusions 
Question – Please tell me about the last time you experienced feeling that you were 
very special, unusual or important? 
2. Aim – to explore relationships with others 
Question – What were your relationships with others like at that time? 
3. Aim – to explore events/factors preceding the development of grandiose 
delusions 
Question – Can you tell me a little bit about what was happening in your life at that 
time? 
Question – When did you first noticed/started thinking that you were…? 
4. Aim – to explore participants’ explanations for experiencing grandiose 
delusion 
Question – What is your understanding of these experiences? 
Question – Has your understanding changed over time and how? 
 
FIRST PERSON ACCOUNTS OF GRANDIOSE BELIEFS 60 
 
 
participants’ accounts, they were chosen to reflect action instead of topic where 
possible. This means that the researcher attempted to use verbs instead of nouns, for 
example, ‘feeling strong’ instead of ‘strength’. Those codes that kept reappearing were 
applied to a large amount of data, the method known as focused coding.   
Theory development. Theory development began with theoretical coding. During 
this process the initial codes were compared for similarities and differences, 
subsequently leading to the development of higher-level categories (for an example see 
Appendix I2). The categories that emerged using this method were more interpretative 
and abstract than the initial codes.  Re-reading transcripts during the process once new 
categories emerged, enabled more thorough analysis and further links and categories 
were formed. The development of more conceptual ideas was enabled by moving 
constantly between a focus on the similarities among categories and a focus on 
differences between categories. Theory development was recorded throughout the 
research process, using memo-writing (for an example see Appendix I3).  Memo-
writing included thoughts about the data and the analytic process and it helped to 
identify ideas or questions that needed to be explored further, enhancing theory 
development. 
Theoretical sampling. Grounded theory methodology uses theoretical sampling, 
which means collecting data in parallel to the process of analysis and in light of the 
categories that are developed. Data are collected to explore the emergent theory further 
allowing the researcher to refine and elaborate incomplete categories, to distinguish 
between categories and to explore relationships between categories (Charmaz, 2006). 
As a result, the SSIS changed over time in order to generate new questions and explore 
ideas that arose from the ongoing analysis. For example, although the category Safety 
and Protection emerged as significant in the first interview, it needed further 
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exploration. Specific questions relating to this category such as “Who is protecting 
you?” and “What does it mean, feeling safe?” were asked in subsequent interviews.  
Theoretical sampling also meant that participants were recruited in order to 
answer the research question rather than on the basis of their representativeness. 
Therefore as the theory was developed and new questions and categories emerged, these 
informed recruitment. For example, most participants’ accounts featured two differing 
states, a state of depression and a state of elated mood. In these participants, who also 
had a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, GDs appeared to be closely associated with a state 
of elated mood. The question was raised whether the emerging theory would be 
applicable to GDs found in individuals with a different diagnosis, who did not 
experience elated mood, which informed recruitment. 
Once analysis of an interview is complete researchers sometimes ask participants 
to verify categories that emerged or to clarify any points further. This can increase 
validity as well as aid in elaborating and refining emergent categories. The same 
participants were not returned to in the current study due to the likelihood of an 
individual’s account differing greatly depending on their mood.  However, the emergent 
categories were explored with new participants, ensuring that the basic concepts 
developed were shared between participants. In order to capture the impact of mood on 
the phenomenon studied the researcher aimed to recruit participants differing in mood. 
In addition, the study included participants who were currently experiencing GDs, as 
well as those who experienced them in the past and were considered to be in remission, 
since it was predicted that participants may view and talk about their experiences 
differently depending on this factor. 
Theoretical saturation. The current study aimed towards theoretical saturation, a 
point at which no new categories or no new properties of the core categories were being 
identified, although researchers have questioned whether this is truly attainable (Dey, 
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1999). Theoretical saturation was verified by the research supervisors through the audit 
of the individual transcripts and the developing categories.   
Quality 
Elliott, Fischer, and Rennie’s (1999) guidelines were followed in order to increase 
the current study’s quality and to ensure good practice. In particular, Owning one’s 
perspective and Providing credibility checks were carefully considered and viewed as 
integral parts of the research process.  
The researcher aimed to be aware of her own theoretical and personal views and 
how these might impact on data, by keeping a reflective journal and discussing main 
themes with research supervisors. Reflexivity has been conceptualised as differing from 
a simple reflection, and includes an explicit evaluation of the self throughout the 
research process (Shaw, 2010). It is deemed important to understand what happens in 
the interactions between researcher and participants, and later between researcher and 
the data, and how researcher influences these processes. This understanding can help us 
to distance ourselves from the data and generate alternative and multiple interpretations. 
The researcher actively engaged with this processes asking questions such as “Why was 
this category chosen?”  
The credibility of the findings was ensured through audits by research supervisors, 
who audited approximately 57% of the data (two transcripts each). More specifically, 
they were provided with the transcripts, initial codes and developing categories 
(including subcategories and their properties). The research supervisors independently 
checked these materials whilst looking for new categories, properties and links.  
Results 
The core category that emerged from the analysis was Expanding Sense of Self. 
This category brought together all the other categories that emerged and was strongly 
evident across participants. It is therefore considered central to the experience of GDs. 
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Four categories described processes involved in self-growth: Higher Consciousness, 
Search for Healing, Re-gaining Control and Element of Truth and Validation. The 
processes involved in self-growth are likely to be multi-directional, with an expanding 
sense of self leading to further healing, an increase in control and feelings of validation, 
as well as these impacting on each other. The proposed framework can be seen in Figure 
2. Each category and the links between them will be described in turn, and illustrated 
using anonymised transcript excerpts. 
 
Figure 2. Participants’ Theory of Grandiose Beliefs 
 
Expanding Sense of Self  
Participants gave accounts of always feeling like they were different to others (1). 
Although some described themselves as unworthy and unimportant, and others 
described themselves as worthy and special, most participants had both of these views 
of self at different points in time. Some participants reported a sense of self that was 
highly dependent on factors such as physical appearance, achievements, relationships 
and mood (2), which could explain the fluctuating self-esteem. In some cases, this 
Expanding Sense  
of Self 
Higher 
Consciousness 
Search for 
Healing 
Re-gaining 
Control 
Element of Truth 
and Validation 
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absence of continuity of self-identity appeared to have led to a lack of real sense of self 
and one’s personality (3) or wishing they could develop a new self-identity which 
would be more stable and less fluid (4).  
1 “I can remember, as young as I can remember that I… I were different, thought 
different to others” (Paul, 5) 
 
2  “I’m a designer so I made a collection and I was very happy with the collection 
and I started to, my self-esteem started to go higher… But I think that’s because no 
one can be as proud of me as I am of myself. I am proud of my achievements and I 
was then.” (Ella, 39) 
 
3 “…it’s a bit of a clash of personalities. If I’m on a downer I’ll be right shy and 
put my head down but if I’m on top of the world and I think the world loves me 
and I’m all happy I can be quiet outgoing. So I don’t know what my personality 
really is.” (Mary, 110) 
 
4 “It’s sort of not having these two anymore, it’s completely get rid of these two 
??? new creation or identity where I’m not that person anymore.” (Susan, 751) 
 
During the experience of GDs participants reported a positive sense of self and 
high self-worth. Moreover, they described a journey of self-discovery leading to an 
expanding sense of self. Participants talked about finding out who they were, being 
allowed to be themselves and expressing themselves (5). Some also reported 
experimenting with being someone else, reaching their potential or changing as a person 
(6). Grandiose beliefs were viewed by many participants as a potential for positive 
personal and spiritual change. 
5 “it was me just coming out saying to the world ta ta da this is who I am.” (Susan, 
449) 
6 “when you enter these altered states of mind that you kind of become the 
opposite you know it’s a chance to be all these things that you are not normally. 
(…)…it makes you wonder if, when you are in those states and you’ve experienced 
those things, if it’s some ability that you may have.” (Lisa, 608) 
 
Higher Consciousness 
Most participants described a higher state of consciousness, which was 
characterised by heightened perception and moving from a focus on materialism to 
increased spirituality. More specifically, as their perceptions changed individuals were 
experiencing the world as more spiritual (7). This process was found to vary between 
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participants in terms of the speed by which it happened and the level of consciousness 
and control that participants had over it. Some described moving quickly into this 
altered state (8) whilst others reported slower more gradual process and having more 
control and awareness of this change (9).  
7 “I started seeing like trees as l- lungs of the planet and things and just seeing if 
the, it started, the, the, there seemed to be slightly more magical thing to a, a, a lot 
of nature.” (Tom, 19) 
 
8 “Yeah, well it was very quick really.  When I go into these I’m there within a 
week…” (Lisa, 388) 
 
9 “…they build themselves up over a period of, say like two or three months (…) 
…whenever I’ve been manic I’ve always just been just able to keep hold of reality 
of it and, and know that my head was going, other than when I’ve been on my own 
m- my thoughts have gone further” (Tom, 173, 504) 
 
During the state of higher consciousness the participants experienced spiritual 
connections with other people, nature and supreme beings such as God and Christ. 
Some described feeling close to and interconnected with the other, although remaining 
conscious of and retaining some sense of self as a separate identity (10). Other 
participants experienced a complete loss of the boundaries between self and the other, to 
the extent of becoming the other and experiencing sense of oneness (11).  
10 “really feeling linked to Christ's spirit or whatever it is (…)I just stood staring 
into the mirror and I saw my face like I saw all stars coming round as if the, 
because light, it were, there were only candlelight in the room so I saw all stars 
round and silhouette of my face had got a beard like it, it, it, it, it changed from  
being me into all classical Jesus, everybody, it wasn't, so I still wasn't thinking I 
was but I was thinking it was coming through me erm.” (Tom, 649, 524) 
 
11 “I thought I was Mother Nature and that was just, I didn’t really feel like I had 
any powers I just felt like I was her” (Lisa, 44)  
 
The state of higher consciousness and heightened perceptions also led the 
individuals to experience their world as highly significant and meaningful. Individuals 
began to feel that they had a purpose in life or a destiny (12), believing that their life 
was going to change (13). As a result they experienced changes in their self-identity, 
leading them to feel special, worthy and important (14). 
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12 “all my beliefs about that purpose around me ended up coming true, around me, 
like signs and awarenesses, I just interacted with them and like (…) Like messages, 
communicating, as far as I can remember, since I was little, and I just felt like I had 
a purpose.” (Paul, 7) 
 
13 “And I just feel like, if I start following, if God gives me a message and I start 
following it that will lead to another one and another and another and another. And 
it will just end up changing my life.” (Ella, 75) 
 
14 “I’m this golden child I’m special I’m perfect like I’m doing it with my life but 
you are not doing nought with yours” (Paul, 168) 
 
Search for Healing 
The category Search for Healing was developed from participants’ description of 
how experiencing unbearable pain impacted on self-identity, leading the individual to 
search for healing and subsequently to experience an expanding sense of self. The 
category contains four subcategories Managing Loss, Pain of Responsibility, Safety and 
Protection and Experiencing Unconditional Love .  
Most participants talked about experiencing intense emotion and pain. There was 
also a general sense that expressing this emotion was not accepted by others and that 
instead it was expected that they should hide it from other people or bottle it up (15). In 
particular, participants talked about the systems where expressing feelings was not 
acceptable or encouraged such as Christianity, police force and a patriarchal society, 
leading them to feel that their emotions were not important (16). Furthermore, the 
expectation of hiding their feelings was likely to result in emotions being experienced as 
overwhelming and more difficult to accept or manage (17).  
15 “No one really wants to be around thing when I’m depressed anyway. If I get 
really really depressed like inconsolably weeping about something, grieving about 
something, everyone is just oh shut up you are so annoying (laughs), stop that” 
(Ella, 240) 
 
16 “nobody gave shit about my feelings, sorry. Everybody would always trash my 
feelings (…)…women are a feeling sort of, we are feelings people …Sometimes 
we are told as women that feelings aren’t good, particularly in the Christian world 
that feelings, don’t go by your feelings” (Susan, 75, 433) 
 
17 “Like you are not supposed to cry out of your house. You are supposed to cry 
quietly when you get home but I have to release that otherwise I can’t carry on with 
my day. It’s so powerful, that emotion. It’s like churning, what it feels like is from 
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the bottom of my spine and shoulders, churning all that negative emotion into 
having a quick cry.” (Mary, 491) 
 
Participants talked about expressing their feelings during their experience of GDs 
(18), and described higher consciousness and heightened perceptions helping them to 
cope with distressing feelings (19). Indeed, the change in consciousness appears 
strongly linked with the experience of intense emotion. Most participants described 
experiencing distressing feelings prior to changes in perception. Sometimes these 
overwhelming feelings appeared to lead directly to heightened perceptions, in which 
case the process was more likely to be quick and less conscious (20). At other times 
distressing feelings appeared to lead to an increase in positive feelings and elated mood 
(21), which was subsequently followed by the experience of higher consciousness. 
18 “I think a lot of it is to do with feelings and emotions you’ve kept held down.” 
(Lisa, 152) 
 
19 “like trees and wind blowing and stuff like that, it’s like it’s all interacting as 
one. I don’t know but it’s like a message to me, ‘cos I get stressed out and wound 
up, it’s like calmer, it calms me down. If I’m getting wound up I listen to trees 
blow, it sooths me and that.” (Paul, 93) 
 
20 “When I go into these I’m there within a week so there wasn’t a lot of time of 
feeling down and stuff like that, it was just a kind of sense of just pain you know 
that emotional pain of rejection.” (Lisa, 388) 
 
21 “that was over something had gone off with my daughter that brought it all back 
and I didn't want to face Christmas and I let myself go manic, I encouraged…” 
(Tom, 1175) 
  
Participants described a process of moving from distressing to positive feelings. 
Some individuals remembered making a conscious decision that their life had to change 
(22) and others talked about actively doing things to make themselves feel better (23). 
For some positive feelings and an increase in spirituality and participation in spiritual 
activities (e.g. praying and meditation) was linked to experiencing hope and validated 
their feelings (24). Indeed, the experience of GDs was viewed by some as a journey of 
recovery (25) during which the individuals had the opportunity for healing (26).  
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22 “I made a decision in January 2011 that I was not prepared to put up with this 
life as it was anymore… From that day on things have moved on and on and on.” 
(Nigel, 69, 98) 
 
23 “And I felt very lonely so I started to see my friends more. And I started treating 
myself to manicures and bikini waxes and fake tans, and things like that, and 
shopping.” (Ella, 182) 
 
24 “… and then you know believing, that was the first time I really really prayed 
and I felt a lot of peace after I prayed. And it was at that point I thought my 
feelings were really validated.” (Susan, 71) 
 
25 “Experience of feeling special and unique has come about, it was in the last 
eighteen months in my recovery stage.” (Nigel, 3) 
 
26 “I’ve liked, focus on something, tried to be good things, focusing on things that 
bring me alive and make me feel happy. And it’s like, I’m sure it’s healing my 
brain in a way.” (Mary, 330)  
 
Managing Loss. The experience of loss and its impact were evident in most 
accounts. Participants described emotions such as pain, grief, sadness, anger, guilt, 
blame and fear (27). For some participants it was the loss of a person and a relationship, 
for some it was a threat of abandonment and for others it was a loss of a role and status 
that caused these emotions (28). Since participants described their sense of self as 
dependent on factors such as relationships and status, the loss of these is likely to lead to 
a loss of part of self and to impact on self-identity and self-worth. One participant spoke 
about their closeness to God making them feel complete (29). Participants also talked 
about their experience of higher consciousness having a function of relaxation (30), 
enabling them to stay positive and cope with their loss experience, whilst continuing 
with life (31). 
27 “…I get really really depressed like inconsolably weeping about something, 
grieving about something…” (Ella, 241) 
 
28 “So all of a sudden, having been through 30 years unblemished career, enjoying 
my work (…) And I couldn’t cope. Because my two children were early teenagers, 
my wife was only on small amounts of salary per year. That’s what sent me 
crashing.” (Nigel, 338) 
 
29 “And to be able to have that communion with God and be complete without, 
you know, my son doesn’t make me complete, [name] doesn’t make me complete, 
God makes me complete. And now I’ve had completeness hopefully I can be a bit 
more healthy.” (Susan, 599) 
 
FIRST PERSON ACCOUNTS OF GRANDIOSE BELIEFS 69 
 
 
30  “I longed for another baby but because I had the miscarriage, and they messed 
about with me and pulled and tucked me, I felt all the pain down there, do you 
know what I mean, painfulness. This is when I started going into that erm car light 
thing, like cars shining lights at me, and lights would pass around my room like 
that, you know headlights, at night time they would go round like ??? and I used to 
hypnotise myself. And it used to make me feel relaxed in my body.” (Mary, 172) 
 
31 “R: (…) you said that it all kind of started around the time…that your daughter 
was taken away… 
P: …I didn't want there to be any chance that, of her thinking as she got older and, 
that, with her not seeing me that, yeah? I didn't, yeah, so I didn't want to do that to 
her so that were the only thing that were making me hold on and I can remember 
going out fields taking the dog for a walk and just, it was like every day was how 
am I going to get through today without doing something, and it just come in my 
head, the, the, the link between [name] and, and cannabis… (…) I’m trying to 
make myself occupied to think about, to feel positive…” (Tom, 564, 646) 
 
Pain of Responsibility. Most participants described feelings of responsibility and 
guilt. Some felt guilty about not doing anything to protect other people and others talked 
about their actions and the impact of their actions on others, which caused them to feel 
guilty (32). These feelings probably impacted on how individuals saw themselves. 
Indeed, some described believing that they were inherently bad and deserved to suffer 
(33). During the experience of GDs some participants described a general sense of 
responsibility to protect others and understood this to be due to having special identity 
or powers (34), whilst others described a lack of responsibility and guilt for their actions 
(35). Some beliefs about one’s own responsibility appeared to be closely linked to the 
beliefs of being special and having special powers, suggesting their importance in 
managing these difficult feelings (36). 
32 “We’d actually, on the day he had his accident I decided I had enough and I 
finished the relationship (…) I kind of thought it was my fault and at that time as 
well I was thinking, I had lots of believes about energies and things… (…)…I 
think it was the way of kind of making me feel, you know, I felt, I suppose I felt, 
although it took me a long time to acknowledge that, think I did feel responsible 
(…)if I just left it that he had gone, found his own way back, than he probably 
wouldn’t have been in the car that night driving to his friends and, you know, 
everything would have been different…” (Lisa, 214) 
 
33 “I’ve been thinking well that’s God’s punishment for me. God punished me. 
And that was looking at evil, I’m an evil person, bad person, bad me” (Susan, 685) 
 
34 “Yeah it is a lot of responsibility. I feel like, yeah, it feels like I just got weight 
on my shoulders and it’s like I don’t want to mess up ‘cos it’s a gate like for 
afterlife, but then I have to think about everyone else’s life. If I know what it’s 
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doing to my own life I turn around and think well, it’s not just doing it to me, it’s 
tied in with others so I’m trying to protect you as well as myself from what I think 
is wrong.” (Paul, 202) 
 
35 “…sometimes, feeling like I can’t be caught out so I’ve been unfaithful to my 
partners and thinking they’ll never find out, they can’t catch me. Or if I do 
something wrong no one will mind.” (Ella, 14) 
 
36 “While he was on life support I started to get these feelings I needed to do 
certain things, to make, because he was in a coma, to bring him back.  And I started 
thinking I was a faith healer so that was a starting point.” (Lisa, 19) 
 
Safety and Protection. Most participants talked about experiencing strong fear 
and panic. They described experiencing a fear of rejection, being let down by the law 
and a society who failed to protect them, and events or people that caused them to feel 
unsafe (37). Feeling unsafe and unprotected is likely to foster a negative image of self as 
unlovable and unworthy. The findings suggest that the experiences of feeling special or 
having special powers may have a function of safety and protection. For example, some 
participants described feeling detached from the world and from the feeling of panic 
when experiencing GDs, which made them feel safe (38). Participants believed they 
would be protected by their special powers or their special identity (39) and felt like 
they were looked after and protected (40). Participants also described developing a 
closeness to God in parallel with experiencing distressing beliefs and hallucinations 
(41). One participant gave an account of moving from fear to hope in their attempt to 
manage the intense feeling of lack of safety and protection and used methods such as 
praying, which helped them to feel closer to God and cope with fear (42). 
37 “And, you know, what a psychiatrist would call paranoia was actually a real 
fear. It wasn’t something that wasn’t real. It actually was happening. I mean, I was 
assaulted a few times by work colleagues and it was real. I had the bruise, you 
know.” (Susan, 24) 
 
38 “Well, you put like a, I call it a glass wall, like a screen round your body and 
your head, there is a wall between you and the world and then you can go out there 
and just carry on. (…) when I went to the shops the other day (…)  I felt like my 
guard had come down and I was sinking into the floor. So, I don’t know if that 
means I’m getting better, trying to leave that shield, but it’s so scary I can’t manage 
without it. (…) But I don’t know if it’s me trying to live in the real world but I 
want to be in that bubble, to protect me.  (…) 
R:  And when you feel special and famous it feels safe? 
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P:   Yeah, I feel like I could climb a mountain when I’m safe. I go rushing around.” 
(Mary, 75) 
 
39 “…he is accusing me but ’cos I’m special and perfect, I’m this golden child, I 
know what to say to get me out of it, from the Devil, gets me out of tr, because I’ve 
been good and I’ve got God with me and ‘cos I’ve been good and special for God.” 
(Paul, 228) 
 
40 “It’s like if I hear car beep, I think it means they are going to watch me. You 
know, if car beeps it’s like saying [her name] is looking out of the window or [her 
name] is walking down the street.(…) It’s like they are watching out for me (…)if I 
needed help there might be somebody there.” (Mary, 303) 
 
41” I started to see things and have not auditory hallucinations but visual and touch 
and smell hallucinations. And I thought they were like bad spirits and at that same 
time I started to feel more close to god, I don’t know why.” (Ella, 33) 
 
42 So that was when I prayed and I didn’t see anyone else in the room I just said 
Father God you know if you are there I really need help. And it was at that point I 
just felt this peace and all the fear went.” (Susan, 218) 
 
Experiencing Unconditional Love. Most participants talked about the 
importance of love and the impact of unconditional love on their experiences of GDs. 
Some talked about feeling unloved and experiencing a lack of comfort and emotional 
support from their primary caregivers (43). Others described a strong fear of rejection 
and felt unsecure in relationships. Feelings of being unloved and the lack of emotional 
support and comfort had led participants to view themselves as unlovable, unworthy and 
unimportant, subsequently searching for love and special care (44). For example, many 
talked about idealising romantic relationships, which often led to disappointment (45). 
Others described the importance of feeling loved, together with the fear of losing that 
(46). During the experience of GDs participants described experiencing unconditional 
love through feeling interconnected with the other (47). Some felt that their experiences 
of being close to God enabled them to experience these important feelings of love and 
acceptance, subsequently impacting on their self-worth and helping develop an 
expanding sense of self (48). 
43 “there has been so much in my family emotional neglect because I think my 
mum and dad kind of stayed together, fell out of love long and then stayed together 
and I never witnessed any emotional love. (…) yeah, there was never, very, very 
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little things shown and, and I think that that's contributed to why I’m like I am” 
(Tom, 1003)  
 
44 “…there is nobody on this planet that is loved as much as you in this particular 
moment. And it’s between us. But we should all experience that. And when we 
don’t we look for it in all sorts of different places.” (Susan, 472) 
 
45 “I know deep down really I think I’ve grown up for most of my life with this 
sort of Walt Disney mentality where one day I’d go to the ball. (…) This is where 
I’m going to meet the man of my dreams. And actually no it wasn’t. And having to 
deal with that disappointment of where else is he gonna be. He should be, you 
know, almost like a bit of a, when your child realises that father Christmas isn’t 
real.” (Susan, 32, 51) 
 
46 “And also, I think that he was the, he was the first person that I had who really 
made me, he really did make me feel really loved (…) And it was this sudden 
potential loss of, that he might die or whatever” (Lisa, 358) 
 
47 “I’ve had connections with trees, feeling unconditional love coming out of 
trees.” (Lisa, 65)   
 
48 “And my mum rejected me years ago but she’d been rejecting me all my life. 
You know, but God didn’t reject me and in all that mess (…) Jesus was the man 
that actually went out of his way on purpose to get to me and tell me do you know 
what [name] I love you and I accept you don’t matter what anyone else thinks.” 
(Susan, 412, 757) 
 
Re-gaining Control   
Most participants described experiencing a lack of control and feelings of 
powerlessness throughout their lives, which impacted on their sense of self (49). The 
agents of control featuring in their accounts ranged from powerful individuals to 
establishments and authorities such as family, school, courts, police, psychiatric 
systems, as well as wider society (50). Participants described different processes and 
means of control. For example, they talked about being physically threatened or bullied, 
having a lack of choice, being held back and being intruded upon (51). 
49 “But my own feeling about it is that it comes from feeling quite disempowered 
really, through your life, being quite a disempowered individual (…) Like you are 
not fully, you are not being your potential and you are not kind of realising, you are 
not actually being what your potential really is, because of your experiences that 
you’ve had, and you feel like you’re keeping this, kept down.” (Lisa, 493) 
 
50 “, she used to rule me with the rod of iron. She’d tell me what I can buy what I 
couldn’t, if I could use the tumble dryer or if I could do this. And she was such a 
tyrant. And I just took it and took it of her all those years.” (Mary, 384) 
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51 “It’s like me and Satan, we are in court now. I pursue him, he is invading my 
life, like he come to my life but didn’t have no legal doc no legal ??? to say that he 
could.” (Paul, 176) 
 
Participants’ accounts showed that during the experience of GDs the individuals 
attempted to re-gain control, to feel that they had power to make a difference, have an 
impact on others, be listened to and taken notice of, and be able to do what they want to 
do (52). Instead of blending in and being invisible they started to become visible (53). 
They moved from feeling vulnerable, weak and unable to make changes to gaining 
strength to make changes (54). Subsequently they felt more powerful, which was likely 
to impact on their self-image and self-worth. As individuals re-gained control they 
started to view themselves as important and worthy, and act accordingly (55). Re-
gaining control allows individuals to express themselves. For some individuals 
empowerment led to healing and recovery, which then led to further increases in 
positive self-identity and viewing the self as special and unique (56). 
52 “… Another thing that happens as well, the whole reason for being naked is to 
do that it makes me feel like I’m in my power running naked, I don’t know just 
something about it just makes you feel like you are invincible and really strong and 
people react to that as well don’t they so because you are thinking people are 
scared of you and people get in a state because you take your clothes off but it kind 
of feels a bit like, powerful yeah” (Lisa, 418) 
 
53 “a friend of mine came to see me and I said to him I’m an angel and he said I 
know you are, “I’ve always been able to see your wings and I said yeah they are 
huge and they are iridescent and they’ve got pink in them” (Lisa, 272) 
 
54 “And you know it’s made me stronger. And I am special, you know. And I 
wanna help other people going through the same shit to get them some help.” 
(Susan, 272) 
 
55 “I sat on that nice and high up and I sat them down on the settee nice and low 
down” (Tom, 1288) 
 
56 “That afternoon, having never been out of the house, never spoken to anybody, I 
signed three Irish songs and I signed two rock song, backed by the first time in my 
life by a band made up of service users. So that was absolutely a key in my 
recovery. (…) So that’s where the confidence has come back and it must never be 
mixed up with arrogance.” (Nigel, 164, 270) 
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Element of Truth and Validation   
The category Element of Truth and Validation relates to the reality of beliefs 
experienced. Although most participants questioned the complete reality of their 
experiences, they still held strong beliefs about the possibility that these were true or 
that they contained an element of truth. The narratives suggested an idea of multiple 
truths, and beliefs that ranged from those thought to be entirely personal (57) to those 
shared by other individuals (58). 
57 “P:   Because that feeling good really isn’t really real, it’s part of the illness, 
isn’t it? 
R:  Is that what you feel?  
P:   It’s hard to say, it’s hard to say. It’s real to me but is it real, that’s the question. 
Is it real or not? To me it is real.” (Mary, 253) 
 
58 “all these people can’t be just completely bonkers. There is a lot of stuff that’s 
happening that we all experience.” (Susan, 382) 
 
Participants talked about truth based on a different realm and on a different 
understanding of the world such as through atoms and archetypes (59). Some accounts 
suggested that what is considered to be reality was often related to cultural and religious 
practices and beliefs of the society in which one lives. The understanding of truth and 
reality in some cultures was thought to differ greatly from ours and to be founded on 
intuition (60) and spirituality (61). 
59 “I don’t want to be offensive to people who don’t have bipolar but I think it puts 
you on a different frequency to everyone else, let’s you think about things that 
other people aren’t capable of thinking about, you feel things that other people 
aren’t capable of feeling. (…) At the time I’d been meditating and thinking about 
atoms and particles, and thinking about everything atomically.” (Ella, 406) 
60 “I think when you’re, when you’re in, just saying what if that stuff, the 
grandiose stuff that you are experiencing, what if there is an element of truth in 
those things, you feel like you are getting insights into things and wisdoms, there is 
supposed to be thing that in tribal cultures when people experience these things, 
that they’re kind of respected and seen as people who show what’s wrong within 
the tribe and they are listened to…” (Lisa, 629) 
 
61“…you feel things that other people aren’t capable of feeling. And like a lot of 
monks, Native American worriers, they put themselves through intentionally 
painful things so they are closer to the spirit world, closer to God all the rest of it. 
So it’s only natural for someone who is experiencing a lot of intense emotion to be 
opened up to a different realm.” (Ella, 410) 
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Some participants wondered whether their experiences were metaphors to help 
them through the healing process and to signal pain on both an individual and societal 
level (62). On the other hand, some participants described beliefs grounded in truth. For 
example, one participant expressed beliefs about his skills and qualities, which he 
already possessed but felt they were exemplified by being empowered and re-gaining 
confidence (63). 
62“But it's something special that's happening to you, yeah, and so whereas I 
thought that I was going to make a difference at the time I think after it was a 
metaphor and it just really, literally just come in my head the difference I was 
going to make was to me (…) I think that we're a warning system, we're, yeah, 
we’re sensitive so that society should take some notice, not believe we're Jesus but 
accept that as a metaphor for something's wrong ” (Tom, 978, 1075) 
 
63 “I always knew that when I was a bank manager and a financial advisor that I 
was consciously competent at my job. I knew how to talk to people, I knew how to 
listen to them far far more than talk, and empathise with them. So those skills were 
always there” (Nigel, 16) 
 
The importance of being believed and feeling that their experiences were 
validated, either by other people or through the confirmation from the environment, was 
strongly highlighted throughout the accounts (64). The validation of participants’ 
experiences was found to impact on an expanding sense of self. By feeling validated 
participants moved from not being important and special to feeling important and 
special (65).  
64 “I told him about the hallucinations I’d been having and he explained to me that 
in Islam there is a very valid explanation for those. And I kind of felt there wasn’t 
much to sort out from that point (…) I had been directed to possibly the only 
person that will ever believe me.  I feel like God has taken me towards that path, 
just from following things.” (Ella, 117) 
 
65 “So I think yes I am special, I do believe that. I do believe I’m chosen by God, 
not because I’m brilliant but because I’ve had an experience that is so validated” 
(Susan, 326) 
 
In summary, all the categories appeared to be closely linked and impacted on each 
other. Nevertheless, Expanding Sense of Self emerged as a central category, since it 
featured as most significant in all of the accounts. Furthermore, all the other categories 
FIRST PERSON ACCOUNTS OF GRANDIOSE BELIEFS 76 
 
 
appeared directly linked to this core category and showed how the participants 
experienced an expanding sense of self. 
Discussion 
This study explored seven first person accounts of grandiose beliefs, using a 
grounded theory method. The experience of an expanding sense of self was central in 
the participants’ stories. Four other processes emerged as significant and likely to 
impact on the expanding sense of self: higher consciousness, searching for healing, re-
gaining control and experiencing an element of truth and validation.  
The participants reported a fluctuating self-esteem and a lack of a real sense of 
self at times. The experience of GDs led them to experience high self-esteem and an 
expanding sense of self. Issues related to self-esteem in individuals who experience 
delusions have been highlighted in other literature. There is growing evidence in 
support of the dynamic nature of self-esteem, in particular linking the fluctuations in 
self-esteem with the onset of paranoia (Thewissen et al., 2007). The themes of the loss 
of self and the self-growth resulting from psychosis were also found in a large meta-
synthesis of 97 studies exploring individuals’ accounts (McCarthy-Jones, Marriott, 
Knowles, Rowse, & Thompson, 2013). The current findings suggest that experiences of 
self-growth such as reaching one’s potential and experimenting with being someone 
else, enabled individuals to feel special and unique. Moreover, feeling special and 
unique facilitated the process of self-growth and self-discovery. 
The participants in this study described experiencing a higher state of 
consciousness including heightened perceptions, feeling connected to the other, 
increased significance and meaning, having a purpose and increased spirituality. These 
processes were found to impact on the participants’ expanding sense of self and a view 
of self as worthy and special. The association between psychosis and spirituality is well 
recognised in the literature (Chadwick, 2010; Kinderman, Setzu., Lobban, & Salmon, 
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2006). In the current sample higher consciousness and spirituality appeared closely 
related to GDs and beliefs about self as special rather than to other experiences of 
psychosis. 
In line with Rhodes and Jakes (2010) study, most of the narratives featured 
significant interpersonal difficulties. The findings indicated that it was the emotional 
impact of these difficulties such as feeling frightened, unloved, not believed and 
disempowered, which subsequently impacted on participants’ self-esteem and sense of 
self. Furthermore, the participants described searching for healing as they attempted to 
manage these overwhelming emotions. The search for healing included managing the 
impact of loss and the pain of responsibility, searching for safety and protection and 
experiencing unconditional love. The experience of loss and attempts to rebuild and 
regain what was lost, has been highly significant in other reported first person accounts 
of psychosis (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013). Research has also demonstrated that some 
individuals who experienced psychosis may have had early attachment difficulties and 
therefore perceive their caregivers as uncaring (Parker, Fairley, Greenwood, Jurd, & 
Silove, 1982). As a consequence they may lack feelings of love and safety normally 
developed through a secure attachment (Drayton, Birchwood & Trower, 1998) and have 
low self-esteem (Luke, Maio, & Carnelley, 2004). Participants in the current study 
described searching for unconditional love and feelings of safety in the context of 
higher consciousness, which enabled them to experience these positive feelings. 
The existing theories of GDs view emotion and self-esteem as central in the 
development and maintenance of these beliefs, although they disagree on their exact 
role. The findings of the current study appear most consistent with the model described 
by Knowles et al. (2011), which implicates both direct and defensive roles of emotion 
and self-esteem as relevant in GDs. In line with the direct or emotion-consistent 
pathway, some participants described events such as a success at work, leading to an 
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increase in mood and self-esteem, subsequently resulting in the onset of GDs. On the 
other hand, some participants described negative events and an overwhelming pain 
leading quickly to higher consciousness and GDs. The processes involved in the second 
pathway appeared to be less conscious and not under participants’ control, therefore 
more consistent with the defence theory. However, those participants who reported 
gradual change, more control and a build-up of positive emotion leading to GDs, also 
described experiencing negative events, distressing emotion and struggling with self-
esteem prior to this. They developed coping strategies such as keeping themselves busy, 
which led to an increase in mood and subsequently to GDs. Therefore, current findings 
suggest that GDs may reflect individuals’ attempt to manage distressing and 
overwhelming feelings and their search for healing.  
The spiritual emergence and the spiritual emergency were ideas developed to 
explain different spiritual experiences and the role of spirituality in psychosis (Grof & 
Grof, 1989; Lukoff, 1998; Menzes & Moreiara-Almeida, 2010). Both processes are 
thought to occur as a response to trauma and lead to a changed view of self. In contrast 
to the spiritual emergence, which is a gradual process allowing the individual to retain 
ability to function in the ordinary reality, the spiritual emergency is defined as fast, 
chaotic and confusing, resulting in disturbed functioning (Grof & Grof, 1989; Lukoff, 
1998). As these two concepts appear to link the state of higher consciousness and the 
individuals’ search for healing, they may be relevant for the participants in the current 
study. Nevertheless, even those participants who described disturbed functioning 
viewed GDs as a potential for recovery and healing, provided the environment and 
people around them were nurturing and accepting. 
The current participants described re-gaining control and power during GDs. 
Feeling in control and empowered led them to experience an expanding sense of self 
and a view of self as important and special. Research has demonstrated that individuals 
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with psychosis experience a lack of control and power over their lives (Laugharne, 
Priebe, Garland, & Clifford, 2011). Current findings suggest that grandiose beliefs may 
be one way for individuals to manage a lack of control and power. Some participants 
described less conscious processes leading to increase in strength and power. Others 
described active coping and learning new skills, which enabled recovery and 
empowerment. Both pathways led to a view of self as special and important. 
The participants also described the importance of being believed and feeling 
validated, experiences which were found to impact greatly on their growing sense of 
self as important and special. This was closely related to the participants’ reflections 
that there might be some truth in their experiences. For example, one participant 
described her relationship with her grandmother, who treated her like a princess and 
made her feel special. Consistent with these findings, clinical observations have also 
suggested that GDs may build on a “thread of truth” (Lake et al., 2008, p.1153) and 
“preserved raised areas of self-esteem” (Smith, N. et al., 2005, p.481). However, two 
participants described never experiencing positive feelings about self unless 
experiencing GDs, which again supports the theory of multiple pathways and processes 
in the formation of these beliefs. The findings also suggest that whilst those individuals 
lacking any positive feelings about self may be more likely to experience GDs through 
less conscious processes, individuals with some positive beliefs may be more likely to 
develop positive coping strategies, increases in mood or feelings of hope, gradually 
leading to beliefs of self as special. 
The meaning placed on metaphors and similes emerged as significant for some 
individuals consistent with Rhodes and Jakes (2004) and are consistent with their 
suggestion that real experiences can be transformed by the metaphorical meanings and 
reflect the content of delusions. The fusion of real and metaphorical meaning could be 
related to an increased significance and meaning of life in general, as experienced 
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during the state of higher consciousness. Nevertheless, it could also be related to the 
meaning that the metaphors may hold for the view of self as important and special, 
which appeared to be case for the current participants.  
The participants in the current study also reported experiencing paranoid 
delusions, which appeared closely related to GDs. Knowles et al.’s (2011) model 
implicates self-esteem fluctuations as significant in the close relationship between these 
two experiences. Although the relationship between paranoid and grandiose delusions 
was not directly investigated in this study, there was some evidence consistent with this 
model. Nevertheless, current findings also suggest additional processes which may 
result in the association between the two experiences. The participants fostered feelings 
of safety and protection as they attempted to manage an overwhelming fear and panic. 
For some individuals this was less conscious and in line with the spiritual emergency 
and the defence theory. For others, the process was more conscious. For example, one 
participant described fluctuating hope, which was the beginning of her spiritual 
experience. The use of positive coping strategies such as praying reinforced her feelings 
of safety, love and validation, which probably also helped her to re-gain a sense of 
control over her experiences. Feelings of safety and protection appeared to enable 
individuals to experience self-growth and to develop a view of self as special and 
worthy.  
Study Limitations and Further Research 
It is important to consider the limitations of this study, in order to determine the 
usefulness of its findings. Qualitative research aims to gain rich data and to explore 
individual accounts in depth. The current theory of expanding self was based on seven 
participants and it is uncertain whether it would be applicable to other individuals 
experiencing GDs.  As such the study is limited in the degree to which it might be able 
to influence policy and have a wider impact (McCarthy et al., 2013). However, since the 
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developed framework is conceptual rather than descriptive, it should account for the 
variety of individuals’ experiences and be applicable in different settings (Glaser, 2004).  
The context in which the findings were obtained may impact on the content and 
the transferability of the developed theory. For example, six participants were recruited 
through a service-user led organisation. Although individuals more likely to access 
support of a service-user led organisation may differ from individuals less likely to do 
so, only four participants attended the service-user led groups. It could be that these 
participants more readily shared their stories with other individuals with similar 
experiences, and had already began to develop some common themes and shared 
language. Nevertheless, the theory was also applicable to the participants who did not 
attend these groups. Furthermore, it was relevant for the participants who were 
experiencing grandiose beliefs at a time of the interview, those who experienced them in 
the past, those who reported feelings of paranoia and low mood, as well as those 
reporting elated mood. Therefore, the developed framework for understanding GDs is 
likely to be applicable to other similar individuals. However, six out of seven 
participants had a diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Although the theory was also applicable 
to the one participant who had a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, further research 
should employ a sample where mania is not a feature of the presentation. Furthermore, 
all the participants were White British. It is hoped that the study would encourage 
further research and extend the findings to individuals from other ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds. 
There are also limitations of the quality control procedures used in the study. For 
example, although research supervisors audited a percentage of data, the credibility of 
the developed theory could have been increased by employing more than one researcher 
to independently analyse the data.  
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There are some limitations inherent in the nature of qualitative research and the 
grounded theory approach in particular. First, although the participants were directly 
asked what their explanations were for experiencing GDs, the causality and direction of 
different processes cannot be determined. Experimental and longitudinal designs would 
be better placed to shed light on this. Nevertheless, the participants’ stories, as well as 
other published research, suggest that some processes may be multidirectional, 
impacting on each other. Second, according to the epistemological stance adopted by 
the researcher that meaning is socially constructed, the developed theory of GDs may be 
influenced by the researcher’s interpretations, preconceived ideas and prior knowledge. 
However, the constant comparison of developed categories with raw data and a 
reflexive approach ensured that the developed theory was consistent with the 
participants’ stories and minimised researcher influence. Third, the grounded theory 
approach could also be criticised by the proponents of the first person research as 
reductionist and not focused on the individuals’ meanings and experiences resulting in 
the richness of the individual lived experience being lost, but this was not the aim of the 
study. Since this study focused on understanding basic processes in GDs, further 
research needs to explore each process and can focus more on the meaning individuals 
bring to the experience. 
Future qualitative research should explore the relationship between paranoid and 
grandiose delusions. It may also be valuable to explore whether pathways leading to the 
formation of GDs may differ between individuals who report some positive self-beliefs 
and those who report no positive self-beliefs. 
Clinical Implications 
The single most important implication of this study for clinical practice is the 
need for the mental health professionals to recognise and support the potential for 
healing that may occur during the experience of GDs. This may be through helping 
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clients to achieve a balance between a state of higher consciousness and their ability to 
function in the everyday world. In line with the theory of spiritual emergence, it may be 
beneficial to help individuals develop techniques to slow down the experience and 
ensure it is more gradual and grounded in everyday life. Mindfulness based approaches 
may be appropriate and have been used successfully with people with psychosis 
(Ashcroft, Barrow, Lee & MacKinnon, 2012; Chadwick, Taylor, & Abba, 2005; 
Jacobsen, Morris, Johns, & Hodkinson, 2011).  
This study strongly suggests it is important for psychological therapies to focus on 
increasing self-esteem and fostering a positive view of self. This should include 
managing self-esteem fluctuations and developing a more stable self-concept, whilst 
pursuing opportunities for self-growth. It may be helpful to explore alternative ways of 
gaining an expanding sense of self such as through developing better relationships, 
using positive coping strategies and managing overwhelming emotions. Based on the 
understanding of the importance of relationships and their emotional impact on the 
onset of GDs, Cognitive Analytic Therapy (CAT) may be a helpful therapy. This 
therapy could assist clients’ understanding of unhelpful relationship patterns and the 
impact of emotional context of relationships on their self-concept and self-esteem, 
whilst providing them with strategies to break these patterns and manage the 
overwhelming emotions.  
It is important for mental health professionals to listen to clients’ stories of how 
they make sense of their experiences in order to develop shared meaning of GDs. 
Although the theory developed may be applicable to other individuals with GDs and 
implicates a number of shared processes, it also suggests different processes between as 
well as within individuals. Furthermore, the meaning of the processes such as healing, 
spirituality, control and safety will be different for each individual and it will be 
important to explore these with clients.  
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Finally, attempting to understand a reality different from our own, listening out 
for the elements of truth and validating these to ensure individuals are heard and 
believed, will lead to better relationships between clients and professionals. This will 
help mental health professionals move away from a medical model of GDs towards the 
notion of multiple truths, as well as address the power imbalance in the therapeutic 
relationships. Since feeling controlled and disempowered is likely to contribute towards 
the onset of GDs it is important to support clients to regain control of their lives and 
become active users and/or providers of mental health services. Acknowledging that the 
experience of GDs gives the individual a status of an ‘expert by experience’ would be 
the first step towards this. 
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E4: Screening Questionnaire 
Screening Questionnaire 
 
Substance misuse 
 
Do you use alcohol? 
If yes, what do you use, how frequently, and how much? 
Do you use drugs? 
If yes, what do you use, how frequently and how much? 
Are you currently under the influence of alcohol/drugs? 
 
Risk assessment 
 
Do you have any thoughts about harming yourself? 
If yes, what are these thoughts? 
How often do you have these thoughts? 
Have you got any plans to act on these thoughts? 
If yes, what are these plans? 
Have you ever acted on these thoughts in the past? 
What would stop you from acting on these thoughts? 
 
Do you have any thoughts about harming others? 
If yes, what are these thoughts? 
How often do you have these thoughts? 
Have you got any plans to act on these thoughts? 
If yes, what are these plans? 
Have you ever acted on these thoughts in the past? 
What would stop you from acting on these thoughts? 
 
Psychotic experiences 
 
Do you currently have any beliefs/thoughts or any other symptoms that may 
be causing you distress or prevent you from concentrating in this interview? 
If yes, what are these? 
How much do you believe this? 
How frequently are you having these thoughts? 
How distressed are you by these thoughts? 
How likely are you to act on these thoughts? 
 
Are you currently hearing voices? 
If yes, what are they saying? 
How frequent are they? 
How loud are they? 
How much distress are they causing you? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E5: General Information Questionnaire 
General information 
 
 
Could you please complete this questionnaire to help us gain an 
understanding of the characteristics that individuals taking part in our 
research have.  Please only answer questions you feel comfortable with 
answering. 
 
 
 
1. If you have been given a diagnosis for your difficulties what is this?  
(Sometimes people have more than one diagnosis.  Could you please 
write down all the diagnoses you were given) 
 
 
 
 
 
2. How long ago did you first experience having unusual 
thoughts/beliefs/feelings/sensations such as hearing voices, believing 
you are someone very special or believing that other people were 
after you? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. How many times have you experienced these? (Some people have 
episodes of these symptoms, or they sometimes experience these 
continuously)  
 
 
 
 
4. How many of these have included experiences described as 
grandiose delusions (feeling special/unique, believing you have 
special powers/wealth/talents/knowledge or believing you are related 
to someone important/famous)? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Have you ever/do you currently take any medication for any mental 
health difficulties? If so, please list these and the dosage if known 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the following questions please tick the box that best describes you 
 
 
 
6. What is your age? 
 
 
<18  
18 – 25  
26 – 35  
36 – 45  
46 – 55  
56 – 65  
>65  
 
 
 
 
 
7. What is your gender? 
 
 
Male  
Female  
 
 
 
8. What is your ethnic background? 
 
 
White British  
Irish  
Any other white background  
Mixed White & Black Caribbean  
White & Black African  
White & Asian  
Any other mixed 
background 
 
Asian or  
Asian British 
Indian  
Pakistani  
Bangladeshi  
Any other Asian background  
Black or  
Black British 
Caribbean  
African  
Any other Black background  
Chinese or 
other ethnic group 
Chinese  
Any other ethnic group  
Not stated   
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. What is your marital status? 
 
 
Single  
Married  
Co-
habiting 
 
Divorced  
Separated  
Widowed  
Other  
 
 
 
 
10.  What is your level of education? 
 
 
None  
Left school without qualification  
School level  
Left college without qualification  
College level (e.g. diploma)  
Left university without qualification  
Bachelor’s degree  
Master’s degree  
Doctor’s degree  
Other  
 
 
 
 
11.  What is your employment status? 
 
 
Full time employed  
Part time 
employed 
 
Unemployed  
Other  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
 
 
 
Appendix F: Participant Information Sheets 
 
F1: Participant Information Sheet – NHS 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
F2: Participant Information Sheet – non-NHS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix G: Consent Forms 
G1: Consent Form – NHS 
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Appendix H: Interview Schedule 
Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
 
Please tell me a little bit about your experience of strongly believing that you 
were very special, unusual or important. 
 
1. Aim – to explore the content and the experience of grandiose delusions 
Question – Please tell me about the last time you experienced feeling that 
you were very special, unusual or important? 
Prompts – Please tell me more about that? 
                  What did that mean? 
                  What did you mean? 
                  Can you please give me an example? 
                  How were you feeling at the time? 
  What was going through your mind at the time? 
          What did you do when you were thinking that? 
 
2. Aim – to explore relationships with others 
Question – What were your relationships with others like at that time? 
Prompts – Please tell me more about that? 
                  What did that mean? 
                  What do you mean? 
                  Can you please give me an example? 
                  How were you feeling at the time? 
                 What was going through your mind at the time? 
                  What did you do when you were thinking that? 
 
3. Aim – to explore events/factors preceding the development of grandiose 
delusions 
Question – Can you tell me a little bit about what was happening in your life 
at that      time? 
Question – When did you first noticed/started thinking that you were…? 
Prompts – Please tell me more about that? 
                  What did that mean? 
                    What do you mean? 
                    Can you please give me an example? 
                    How were you feeling at the time? 
                  What was going through your mind at the time? 
                    What did you do when you were thinking that? 
 
4. Aim – to explore participants’ explanations for experiencing grandiose 
delusion 
Question – What is your understanding of these experiences? 
Question – Has your understanding changed over time and how? 
Prompts – Please tell me more about that? 
                  What did you mean? 
                  Can you please give me an example? 
                    What are your feelings about that? 
                    What are your thoughts about that 
        What is the impact of your feelings/thoughts on your behaviour? 
          Where do you think that comes from? 
                              What do significant people in your life think? 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I: Example of Analysis 
I1: Line-by-line coding 
  
 
 
 
I2: Theoretical Coding 
 
These are codes from Interview 1. Initially they were grouped into five 
categories (control, relationships with self & others, emotion, beliefs and 
others not sorted) as the researcher attempted to make sense of them. Re-
reading of the transcript, asking questions of the data and subsequent 
interviews enabled categories, properties and links to be formed. The 
following shows higher order categories beginning to emerge using the 
process of theoretical coding.  
 
 
Control/Power 
 
Having urges/compulsions (feeling a need to do rituals) 
Running naked in public (feeling powerful, expressing self) 
Becoming obsessed (latching on to an idea)  
Feeling powerful 
Experiencing lack of restraint/control (becoming free, expressing herself) Re-
gaining control but also its impact on self-identity, expressing self 
Feeling disempowered 
Becoming powerful 
Having power over others 
Experiencing lack of privacy (being intruded upon) 
Experiencing mum as cutting (taking away her self-esteem) being cut down 
– not allowed to grow, develop, deflated-small, powerless 
Urge to be naked in public (exposed, no curtains, lack of privacy, lack of 
boundaries) 
Feeling out of control (before experiencing psychosis) immediate trigger 
Feeling out of control 
Needing to make things right 
Thinking she can make things right  
Being in unwanted situation (lack of choice) 
Experiencing others as controlling (boyfriend’s mum) 
Feeling controlled/experiencing lack of control 
Experiencing no control (over changes in perception) 
Experiencing no control (over arrival of positive feelings) 
Feeling powerful (when running naked in public) 
Being compulsive – lack of control 
Needing things to feel right – needing to be in control 
Being compulsive 
Being controlled by OCD 
Having power to change things/impact on things 
Working on OCD- not feeling in control- Taking away comfort of OCD and 
experiencing reality as stressful? 
Feeling disempowered explanation for GDs 
Having a chance to be powerful explanation for GDs 
Being held back (by others) 
Experiencing school as controlling 
Feeling oppressed as a woman  
Going to a strict grammar school 
 
 
 
Taking charge of her own health   empowerment 
Feeling controlled – Not allowed to feel, to be herself Impact on self-identity 
Lack of control (over experiencing grandiose beliefs) 
Experiencing psychiatric system as traumatic and spirit breaking not 
safe/caring/loving but disempowering 
Being forced to take meds  
Being forced go to hospital 
Not being allowed to experience altered state 
Complying with medication  Sense of control 
 
 
Becoming manipulative (making others upset/angry – pushing people’s 
buttons) Having an impact/Re-gaining control 
Becoming confrontational Re-gaining control 
Wanting to get a reaction Re-gaining control 
Saying things to get a reaction Re-gaining control 
Having impact on others/being noticed Becoming visible/Re-gaining control 
Enjoying provoking a reaction (dad’s beliefs amusing, feeling in control?) Re-
gaining control 
Feeling strong/lack of vulnerability Re-gaining strength/power/control 
Empowerment 
Wanting to have an impact/cause a reaction Re-gaining control 
Causing others to be fearful Re-gaining control 
 
 
Dimension: From experiencing lack of control and being controlled 
(disempowered) to becoming powerful and feeling empowered 
 
 
Properties: Experiencing lack of control 
When – traumatic situations, lack of choice, school, throughout life 
Who (agents of control) – mum, boyfriends’ mum, school, psychiatric system, 
society/other people, organisations, systems, patriarchal society/school 
What (agents of control) – OCD, grandiose beliefs, urges, feelings, inner 
drive/impulse 
How is she controlled (means of control)– lack of privacy, being intruded 
upon, being cut down, more subtle (boyfriend’s mum), treated differently as a 
woman, medication, hospitalisation, seclusion 
Impact – feeling disempowered, as a woman, patient, daughter, pupil, 
member of society; doesn’t express her needs/wants, lack of confidence, 
negative feelings kept down 
Impact on self-identity – Doesn’t express herself, self as unconfident, fearful, 
unworthy, unimportant, low self-esteem  
 
Properties: Becoming powerful/Re-gaining control 
 
When – altered state, running naked in public 
Who – in relationships 
How –being manipulative, confrontational, provoking reaction, causing an 
impact 
 
 
 
Impact – feeling great, feeling powerful, feeling visible/strong/confident 
Impact on self-identity – becoming somebody else, expressing self  High 
self-esteem? 
 
 
Self-identity 
 
Experiencing beliefs about being special Self as special 
Feeling as if she was someone else Self-identity 
Thinking she was special  
Being unconfident person Self-identity 
Having two opposite sides Self-identity 
Expressing herself (as a woman) Self-identity  
Becoming someone else(opposite to who you are  explanation Self-identity 
Not having positive self-beliefs (unless in an episode) Self-identity 
Becoming the opposite 
Not reaching potential Self-identity (related to disempowerment) 
Struggling with self-esteem Self-worth 
Experiencing lack of confidence 
Thinking she had special power (she was a faith healer, being able to heal 
others) Self-identity/Spirituality 
Thinking she was Mother Nature Self-identity/Spirituality 
Thinking she was special (an angel) Self-identity 
Thinking she had special powers (seeing things other people can’t) 
Thinking she had special powers (observing patterns & predicting future) 
Being scared to express her opinion (Holding back) Fear of rejection?  
Not expressing own needs/wants 
Expressing self/self-identity 
Fear of being herself (fear of being rejected/unloved)  Fear of rejection? Self-
identity 
Feeling too close (to mum) Impact on self-identity 
Lack of boundaries in relationships (with mum) Impact on self-identity 
(feeling intruded upon) 
 
Dimension: From negative self-identity and low self-worth (self as 
unconfident, unimportant, unworthy) to positive self-identity and high self-
worth (self as confident, important and worthy) 
 
Properties: Negative self-identity and low self-worth 
When – everyday life (her usual self)  
Impact – Not reaching potential, not expressing herself, not being self 
Why – Related to control and love? Feeling powerless, intruded upon, not 
allowed to be self, reach potential, grow, lack of praise, not feeling loved 
 
 
Properties: Positive self-identity and high self-worth 
When – only during an altered state 
Impact – Expressing herself, reaching potential, chance to be someone else 
– her ideal self? 
 
 
 
 
Emotions 
 
Feeling great 
Being full of energy 
Feeling good 
Experiencing strong positive feelings (blissful) 
Feeling wound up (negative emotions, unsettled, anxious?)  
Feeling upset 
Feeling unbearable pain Overwhelming emotion 
Expressing her anger/being fearless 
Experiencing a high over seven years 
Experiencing changes in bodily sensations 
Experiencing feelings of depression  
 
Managing emotion 
 
Directing negative feelings at close relationships Managing emotion 
Bottling up feelings Managing feelings 
Expressing anger (by kicking the table) Managing emotion 
Being in denial about feeling responsible Managing feelings 
Moving away from the pain (Moving quickly from feeling pain/rejection to 
altered state of consciousness fo having positive thoughts/feelings) – Not 
letting herself experience pain ? Managing distressing emotion 
Unsure of feelings during changes in perceptions Managing distressing 
emotion Suggests unconscious processes? 
Experiencing reality as stressful Managing emotion 
Seeing OCD as comfort Are grandiose beliefs also comfort/escape from 
reality? Managing emotion 
Fear of giving up comfort of OCD Managing emotion 
Bottling up feelings Managing emotion 
Potential for healing and dealing with past Managing emotion explanation 
 
Dimension: From bottling feelings to expressing feelings 
 
What emotion – positive/high/blissful/great and negative/Guilt, grief, fear (of 
rejection), anxiety, anger 
When is it experienced – positive – only during altered state, negative – 
trauma/loss, rejection, lack of control, prior to altered state 
How she deals with it – bottling up feelings (hiding them, from who – 
self/others), denial, internalising (depression), not letting herself experience 
pain, moving quickly to strong positive feelings, expressing i.e anger (kicking 
the table), becoming opposite, expressing positive emotion 
Why – Unbearable pain, self as unlovable, fear of rejection, feeling out of 
control? 
 
 
Love 
 
Receiving unconditional love Love 
Idealising relationships 
 
 
 
Developing good relationship with dad (due to psychosis) – relationship 
changing, getting stronger Eliciting care/love? 
Feeling loved – not feeling loved before him Experiencing love 
Idealised love Love 
Idealised/romantic love- unrequited love Love (idealised love-managing 
feelings of not feeling loved, looking for love) 
Seeing mum as accepting,( tolerating, allowing , during an episode, different 
how she normally sees her? Eliciting care/Idealised care/love 
Seeing mum as accepting, being good at emotional support (opposite) 
Eliciting care/Idealised care/love 
Feeling rejected/unloved – Experiencing fear of being unloved? Love 
 
Safety &Protection 
 
Needing to be protected Feeling unsafe/Safety&Protection 
Not feeling safe to be herself Safety in relationships 
Feeling safe around people (other patients), sharing beliefs Safety in 
relationships 
Not feeling safe – experiencing world as dangerous Safety&Protection 
Needing to feel safe Safety&Protection 
Not feeling safe/secure in relationships Safety&Protection 
Experiencing panic/anxiety as a child Feeling unsafe/Safety&Protection 
Thinking she had special powers (protective urine) Safety&Protection 
Thinking she was abused Safety&Protection 
 
Pain of Responsibility 
 
Ending the relationship Experiencing loss/Pain of responsibility 
Blaming herself (for the accident- Feeling guilty) Pain of responsibility 
Feeling responsible (“what if”), feeling guilty Pain of responsibility 
Thinking she caused the accident Pain of responsibility 
 
Experience of Loss 
 
Experiencing trauma and potential loss Experiencing loss 
Experiencing potential loss/grief Experiencing loss 
 
Validation 
 
Being told she would be good at something- 
(Acknowledgement/praise/feeling valued) Validation 
Experiencing positive feelings when  believed- Feeling validated, accepted 
Validation 
Experiencing lack of praise/acknowledgementValidation 
Not feeling respected/listened to (by the society/psychiatric system) 
Validation 
Getting confirmation  (about beliefs from other people) Being 
believed/Validation 
Sharing beliefs (with friends) 
Being believed (by friends) 
 
 
 
Getting confirmation from others (friends) Validation 
Not sharing beliefs with everyone 
Sharing beliefs (with other patients) 
Being believed (by other patients) Validation 
Getting confirmation from others (other patients) Validation 
Sharing beliefs with those experiencing similar beliefs (on the same 
level/altered state) Validation 
 
 
Element of Truth 
 
Being unsure of the truth/reality Element of Truth 
Continuing to view beliefs as a possible reality Element of Truth 
Having a sixth sense Intuition/Element of Truth 
Being uncertain about the reality Element of Truth 
Believing in past lives Element of Truth 
Being uncertain about truth/reality Element of Truth 
Acknowledging different levels of being Element of Truth 
Believing in multiple realities Element of Truth 
Grandiose beliefs as a possible reality Element of Truth 
Seeing grandiose beliefs as a message (about what she should be doing in 
life) explanation Metaphor/Element of Truth 
Suggesting a possibility of an alternative reality explanation Multiple 
realities/Element of Truth 
Seeing grandiose beliefs as metaphors explanation Metaphor/Element of 
Truth 
Grandiose beliefs reflecting some reality explanation Element of Truth 
Cultural differences in how grandiose beliefs are viewed (reflecting back to 
society, serving a function) explanation Element of Truth 
Meaning of grandiose beliefs Element of Truth 
Seeing grandiose beliefs as metaphors Metaphors/Element of Truth 
Normality defined by society we live in (Jesus) Element of Truth 
 
Interconnectedness 
 
Being connected to nature Interconnectedness/Spirituality 
Feeling connected to the planet Interconnectedness/Spirituality 
Feeling spiritual connection Interconnectedness/Spirituality 
Believing in shared consciousness – interconnectedness? Spirituality 
 
Spirituality 
 
Having spiritual beliefs (feeling in tune with nature) Spirituality 
Having spiritual beliefs (energy fields) Spirituality 
Having spiritual beliefs (about witchcraft) Spirituality 
Having spiritual beliefs (interest/reading about energy fields) Spirituality 
Spiritual beliefs in family (dad) – Encouraged to have spiritual beliefs (church 
every week) Spirituality 
Grandiose beliefs giving greater understanding/spiritual enlightenment? 
explanation Spirituality 
 
 
 
Supreme being/existence (“maybe somebody somewhere wants to”) 
Spirituality 
Altered state as a spiritual journey (not allowed by the society) Spirituality 
Exploring spiritual beliefs  (beliefs about interconnectedness, God, natur) 
Spirituality 
 
What are the beliefs – spiritual 
When – always there but the conviction of and preoccupation with these 
beliefs varies 
How –, reading, talking about them/not talking about them, acting as if 
Who – sharing (talking about them, not talking about them), response of 
others (being believed/not being believed) 
Why – reading, family background, talking about them 
With what consequences – from having spirit to spirit breaking (response of 
others), spiritual healing/journey, feelings (validated/disempowered) 
 
 
Other (not sorted) 
Falling into the altered state of consciousness Altered 
consciousness/Spirituality 
Acting and feeling different to normal Altered experience 
Being in an altered consciousness 
Experiencing cues in the environment as significant (having a personal 
message) Looking for meaning 
Experiencing changes in perception Altered experience 
Gaining energy (from depression to psychosis) Gaining strength 
Sleeping less in summer Sleep/Mechanism 
Believing that medication is causing depression 
Altered state as a good place to be 
Wishing to experience altered state (in a safe/caring /loving environment -
alternative hospitals, retreats) Safety/care/love 
Grandiose beliefs as a positive experience 
Having strong relationships 
Having changeable/volatile relationships (either loving or hostile) 
Experiencing difficulties in relationships (with dad) 
Feeling she has a special task (in charge, in control) special mission/purpose 
Seeing others as special (other patients on the ward) Explanation for why 
she was there? (said that feelings of being special came when she was at 
hospital) Finding meaning 
Acting as if she had special powers (doing rituals) Doing rituals 
Exploring beliefs about shamanism (reading) Special interest 
Being horrible to others Expressing emotion or Re-gaining control? 
Becoming confident Self-identity or Empowerment? 
Feeling connected to others Interconnectedness/Emotional connection/Love 
or Spirituality? 
Fear of feeling disconnected (fear of feeling unloved, alone?) Managing 
emotion/impact of this-feeling connected/interconnectedness 
Not expressing own wants/needs Fear of rejection 
 
 
 
 
 
I3: Memo-writing 
Expanding Sense of Self 
 
Interview 1 
Self as struggling with self-worth. Not having positive self-beliefs. Feeling 
rejected and unloved (said that her ex was the only person who ever made 
her feel truly loved). This suggests not experiencing unconditional love and 
image of self as unlovable. This also leads to fear of being herself. Feeling 
disempowered/powerless, not wanting to express own wants/needs. Being 
small and invisible. Idea that altered state gives a chance to be someone 
else, so positive self-image is not her. Negative self-image in ordinary life. 
But an exception to that- ex boyfriend made her feel loved. What was her 
image of self then? Did she feel special, loved, worthy? There seems to be a 
strong theme of wanting to cause a reaction, impact on others and become 
visible and noticed 
 
Self as special, powerful, loved, connected, fearless. But exception to this – 
during one episode thinking she was abused. Does this mean image of self 
during altered state unstable or defensive? Possibly related to paranoia or 
the category of Safety & Protection, that is experiencing fear, feeling unsafe 
prior to experiencing GDs. GDs possibly a strategy of managing fear and 
other distressing feelings. 
Described self in relationships, during altered state, as horrible, 
confrontational, manipulative, provoking and pushing. Is this reinforcing her 
positive self-image of powerful, fearless, noticed and worthy whilst 
experiencing altered state? How she sees others varies between special, 
idealised, accepting, allowing and loving to controlling, rejecting, abusive, 
aggressive and dangerous. Similar to how she views self. She moves 
between different reciprocal roles. Experiencing others as controlling and 
rejecting can be a trigger for moving into altered state. Control and fear of 
rejection are important in this narrative and may be separate categories, 
however, related to self-identity and self-worth. Also there is something about 
idealising relationships, is this a separate category? 
 
Interview 2 
Self as Jesus. “It’s not that I am Jesus, it’s that I can be Jesus”. There is 
something about being who he wants to be, chance to be someone else? 
Feeling like there are abilities within him. This is similar to the first interview – 
reaching potential. Talks about being a joker and others finding him funny. 
Image of self as funny. Also talks about playing practical jokes and 
outsmarting others. Image of self as smart/intelligent. Contrary to the first 
interview this does not seem to be dependent on the altered state (more 
dependent on mood?). The experiences which he described as spiritual 
(manic episodes), changing him as a person over time (spiritual growth). 
Although at times of depression self-image likely to be negative. Does he still 
see himself as funny and intelligent? 
 
Interview 3 
Reported a positive self-image and self-worth. Feels this has come from re-
gaining confidence with the old skills and abilities and learning new skills, 
 
 
 
making him feel empowered. Similar to interview 1, self-identity and self-
worth closely linked with power and sense of control. Some of the abilities 
present before (ability to talk to people, put himself in others shoes) 
suggesting positive image prior to GDs but lack of confidence impacting on 
this. Having a special job (talked a lot about his work role and how important 
it is.) Loss of job led to a long period of depression. What did loss of job 
mean? Loss of role/status. He was supporting his family prior to this. Impact 
on self-identity and self-worth as his role changed. Need to explore self-
identity and self-worth in next interview. What leads to changes? What is the 
impact? 
 
Interview 4 
Many initial codes relating to self-image and self-worth. Is there a fragile 
sense of self based on appearance, other people, being liked, achievement? 
Self-esteem appears to fluctuate based on mood. This is related to Interview 
2 & 3. Maybe also to Interview 1 – fear of rejection. Is this related to feeling 
unloved?. Listen out for this in other narratives. She described neglect and 
feeling abandoned, which is likely to lead the person to feeling unloved and 
unsecure in relationships, fearing they will be abandoned and rejected. 
Sense of self as unlovable and unworthy is likely to develop from these 
experiences.  
 
No sense of self/Self disappearing/Loss of self 
 
Two other themes emerged related to this category Self-Care and Autonomy 
or Self-sufficiency. Depending on how one views and values themselves, 
self-care may or may not be important. She moves from neglecting self to 
looking after self. If haven’t had experience of being looked after/cared for 
when little, person might be searching for special care, love, protection. This 
might be better placed in the category Experience of unconditional love. 
This could also be related to Dependency v Autonomy. Moving from being 
dependent on parents when depressed to not wanting to be looked after 
them when manic. Not needing to be dependent but being self-sufficient. 
Being able to care for herself. 
 
“Fragile” sense of self suggests something inherently wrong with the person, 
something that can’t be changed, weak, fragmented. Person may at times 
have a lack of real sense of self, due to sense of self being so dependent on 
external world and mood but this is transient. Do not use this term. 
 
Interview 5 
Low self-esteem, unworthy, trivial, view of self is dependent on mood, other 
people. Similar to interview 1, ordinary self is shy, unconfident, low self-
worth. Because of having extreme views of self not sure what her personality 
really is – lack of real sense of self at times. Does the sense of self need to 
be stable or at least continuous? What is it like to have these two opposite 
views of self – not sure what her personality is. She talks about her positive 
sense of self and self-worth during GDs not being real. Although it seems 
real to her she wonders if it’s part of illness, not how she usually is. Similar to 
interview 4, she talks about disappearing and becoming a shadow. 
 
 
 
 
Interview 7 
Maybe expanding sense of self should be moved to self-identity from spiritual 
journey category. Spiritual journey, validation, interconnectedness, finding 
meaning all describe the process of change in self-identity/self-worth and 
how they develop more positive self-identity and different sense of self. An 
expanding sense of self may also happen for some as part of this. Self that is 
greater than individual’s physical body? Self as part of something bigger i.e. 
nature, universe, God. There is a spiritual understanding of self and the 
world. This is achieved through interconnectedness with other, for example 
Interview 2 described being linked to Christ’s spirit, but he did not think he 
was Christ. Awareness of boundaries although interconnected – Jesus was 
coming through him. Still he is separate from Jesus so separate from the 
other. This is unlike interview 1 – she felt interconnected with nature to the 
point of believing she was Mother Nature. Boundaries blurred. Self not 
separate from the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
